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The Two Faces of the Foreign Intelligence  
Surveillance Court 
EMILY BERMAN* 
When former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden leaked a 
massive trove of information about secret intelligence-collection programs 
implemented under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in the summer of 2013, 
U.S. surveillance activities were thrust to the forefront of public debate. This debate 
included the question of whether and how to reform the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (“FISA Court”), the statutorily created secret court that reviews 
government applications to conduct surveillance in the United States. This 
discussion, however, has underemphasized a critical feature of the way the FISA 
Court works. As this Article will show, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 (“9/11”), the FISA Court has been playing not only its traditional role of 
“gatekeeper,” but also the additional—and entirely different—role of “rule maker.” 
This is the first scholarly examination of this dichotomy and its implications for 
reform. Further, the Article is particularly timely in providing an assessment of the 
recently enacted USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Congress’s attempt to reform the 
court. I argue that, viewed through the lens of the court’s dual roles, the scholarly 
and public conversation has fallen short in two important respects. First, it has failed 
to give the court sufficient credit for its laudable performance as gatekeeper, and 
second, it has ignored the implications that the gatekeeper/rule-maker dichotomy 
has for reform. As a result, I conclude that the USA FREEDOM Act is not only 
woefully inadequate to remedy the problems that it targets but also fails entirely to 
address additional problems with the FISA Court. In light of these conclusions, the 
USA FREEDOM Act represents a missed opportunity. In not fully appreciating or 
accounting for the unique challenges that the court’s rule-making function poses, the 
Act does not go nearly far enough in bolstering the court’s rulemaking competence. 
Moreover, the Act neglects (as has the public debate) a critical area for reform: 
ensuring sufficient flow of information from the executive branch to the FISA Court. 
I therefore explore the nature of this challenge and offer some additional reform 
ideas for consideration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden’s leak of a 
massive trove of information about formerly secret intelligence-collection programs 
in the summer of 2013 prompted a dramatic shift in public awareness of U.S. 
surveillance activities. Almost overnight, the American public learned of several 
aggressive intelligence-collection programs—including programs that collected 
significant amounts of information about innocent Americans—the most 
controversial of which were implemented under the auspices of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).1 These disclosures sparked vigorous 
debate about U.S. surveillance policy and generated significant momentum for 
statutory reform. Most reform discussion revolved around how to modify the 
government’s highly controversial program of collecting and storing vast databases 
of domestic telephony metadata.2 And when the surveillance debate culminated this 
past summer with the enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015,3 Congress did 
indeed place limits on such activity.4 
In addition to debate over what substantive surveillance authorities the 
government should possess, however, both the Snowden revelations and the ensuing 
conversation also shined a spotlight on an obscure institution: the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISA Court”).5 The FISA Court, statutorily created 
as part of FISA in 1978, reviews government applications for foreign intelligence 
surveillance orders—that is, confers approval to engage in surveillance. It was 
created to provide judicial supervision of the federal government’s foreign 
intelligence–collection activities inside the United States. Information revealed in the 
wake of the Snowden leaks called into question the FISA Court’s effectiveness in 
this role. One of the elements of the debate over surveillance reform thus became the 
question of whether and how to reform the FISA Court itself.  
This Article argues that a critical—and underappreciated—element of this 
discussion is the fact that the FISA Court actually plays two very different roles. Its 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of the U.S.C.). 
 2. Metadata generally is defined as data that describes and gives information about other 
data. Communication metadata is information about the communication per se, including 
session identifying information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number or e-mail 
address, communications device identifiers like IP addresses, etc.), routing information, time 
and duration of calls, and similar non-content information.   
 3. Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) (to be codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 4. Whether preexisting law authorized the government’s collection of phone data is a 
matter of vigorous debate, but the USA FREEDOM Act plainly limits bulk collection. See 
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23 sec.103, sec. 201, 129 Stat. 268, 272, 277 
(to be codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1842). 
 5. For details on the creation, operation, and evolution of the FISA Court, see infra 
Part I.A. 
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original and traditional role is that of “gatekeeper.” Since 9/11, however, the court 
has been forced to play an additional, entirely distinct function—that of “rule 
maker.”6  
When the FISA Court operates as a gatekeeper, it acts as a watchdog. As 
gatekeeper, the court evaluates whether government surveillance requests comply 
with legal requirements, much the way a magistrate judge reviews applications for 
search or arrest warrants.7 In other words, the court first screens government requests 
to engage in surveillance of a particular target, applying clearly established law to a 
specific set of circumstances and approving only those collection activities that 
comply with applicable requirements and restrictions. If the court determines that a 
government application should be approved, it issues an appropriate order. Matters 
requiring it to play this gatekeeper function are what the FISA Court was created to 
handle and still form the vast bulk of its docket. 
Since 9/11, however, the court has also been asked to play a new role, what I call 
its rule-maker role. This role is triggered when the court is asked whether 
bulk-collection programs comply with both FISA and the Constitution. The defining 
characteristic of “bulk collection” programs—in contrast to “targeted collection” 
programs—is that a significant portion of the collected data is not associated with 
specific targets or subjects of interest in a particular investigation. When approving 
government surveillance programs that do not involve case-by-case assessments of 
each proposed target, FISA judges do not simply evaluate whether a particular 
surveillance request meets the necessary requirements—whether, for example, the 
government has established probable cause. Rather, they must determine whether the 
rules under which the government has proposed to operate while collecting 
information in bulk satisfy existing law. This rule-maker responsibility represents an 
enormous alteration of the FISA Court’s docket, forcing it to play a role for which it 
was not designed and is not well suited.  
A handful of others have recognized that the court is doing something new of late, 
but this is the first scholarly article to examine closely the dichotomy between 
gatekeeper and rule maker and to explore its implications for reform. I argue that 
discussion surrounding the FISA Court has failed to appreciate the significance of 
this dichotomy. As a result, the public conversation has fallen short in two important 
respects. First, it has failed to give the court sufficient credit for its laudable 
performance as gatekeeper and the extent of oversight in which it has engaged in that 
capacity. Indeed, when in possession of all the relevant information, FISA 
judges-as-gatekeepers have aggressively employed the equitable powers of the 
courts to serve as a meaningful check on the government’s bulk surveillance 
activities.8 Second, while critiques of the FISA Court in its rule-maker role are fully 
justified—the court’s rulemaking has displayed incomplete analysis, relied upon 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. If the term “rule maker” invokes thoughts of administrative law, it is no accident. 
What I call the FISA Court’s rule-making activities resemble nothing so much as agency rule 
making. The resemblance of the FISA Court to an administrative agency, and the implications 
of that resemblance, is an area for future research.  
 7. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 41(d) (authorizing a warrant “if there is probable cause 
to search for and seize a person or property or to install and use a tracking device”). 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
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unconvincing reasoning, and failed to consider important counterarguments9—they 
have ignored the implications that the gatekeeper/rule-maker dichotomy has for 
reform.  
These conclusions permit me to turn the lens of the court’s dual roles on the 
recently enacted USA FREEDOM Act to assess the sufficiency of its reforms to the 
court.10 Given the court’s failure as rule maker, the USA FREEDOM Act represents 
nothing so much as a missed opportunity. In not fully appreciating or accounting for 
the unique challenges that the court’s rulemaking function poses, the USA 
FREEDOM Act does not go nearly far enough in bolstering the court’s rulemaking 
competence. It does include measures that gesture in the right direction—increasing 
the adversarial nature of the FISA Court’s proceedings, augmenting the availability 
of appellate review of FISA judges’ decisions, adding transparency to the court’s 
operations, and increasing FISA judges’ access to technical expertise—but these will 
prove woefully inadequate. Moreover, the Act neglects (as has the public debate) a 
critical area for reform that will play to the FISA Court’s strength as gatekeeper: 
ensuring sufficient flow of information from the executive branch to the FISA Court. 
I therefore explore the nature of this challenge and offer some additional reform ideas 
for consideration.  
Part I of this Article will lay out first the relevant aspects of the FISA Court’s 
operations and then the critiques of those operations. Part II will look closely at the 
FISA Court’s performance as gatekeeper and as rule maker in the approval and 
oversight of bulk-collection programs and argue that the FISA Court has performed 
its gatekeeper function well while failing in its rule-maker function. Part III will 
consider the implications of the FISA Court’s strengths and weaknesses, as set out 
in Part II, for reform as well as critique the USA FREEDOM Act’s reforms to the 
court, pointing out areas in which the Act falls short, as well as areas that it 
overlooked altogether. 
I. THE FISA COURT DEBATE 
The FISA Court has never been entirely uncontroversial, but with the trove of new 
information about the court and its operations revealed by Edward Snowden—and 
by the government in response to the Snowden leaks—controversy over the court 
entered the public debate like never before. Part I.A will discuss the FISA Court’s 
operations, elaborating further on the court’s dual role as gatekeeper and rule maker; 
Part I.B will then catalog the primary critiques leveled at those operations.  
A. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
The FISA Court was created in 1978 by FISA as part of a comprehensive regime 
to impose limits on and oversight of the domestic use of surveillance for the 
collection of foreign intelligence.11 FISA itself was in part a response to revelations 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (to be codified in 
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
 11. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
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in the early 1970s that the U.S. intelligence community had for decades engaged in 
unethical and illegal intelligence collection because intelligence agencies lacked 
“appropriate restraints, controls, and prohibitions.”12 Recognizing that “warrantless 
electronic surveillance in the name of national security ha[d] been seriously abused,” 
Congress and the executive branch agreed not only to subject those activities to 
substantive limits but also to employ Article III judges in ensuring that those limits 
were respected.13 As Senator Birch Bayh stated during the original Senate debate on 
FISA, the Act was intended to “bring an end to the practice of electronic surveillance 
by the executive branch without a court order in the United States.”14 The result was 
the FISA Court. 
The court itself currently comprises eleven federal judges, chosen by the Chief 
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from among sitting U.S. district court judges, to 
serve staggered seven-year terms.15 The membership of the FISA Court at any given 
time is public information, but the vast majority of its work—its proceedings, orders, 
and opinions—has traditionally remained secret.16 FISA also created a FISA Court 
of Review, made up of three federal district or appeals court judges appointed by the 
Chief Justice, to hear appeals from decisions of judges on the FISA Court.17 
While the contemporary FISA Court plays two roles, it was originally designed 
to play just one—gatekeeper. As law and technology have changed over time, 
however, it has taken on a second role—rule maker. The balance of this Part will 
specify what each of those roles encompasses and the FISA Court procedures 
through which they are exercised.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 
AND RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: BOOK II, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 171 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH 
COMM. REPORT], available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files
/94755_II.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KAY-GZ9N]. 
 13. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 
1978, S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908; see 
also CHURCH COMM. REPORT, supra note 12, at 292 (identifying excessive concentration of 
power in the executive as one source of rights violations). 
 14. 124 CONG. REC. 10889–90 (1978) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); see also Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & 
the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 28–29 (1976) (statement 
of Hon. Philip Lacovara, former Deputy Solicitor General) (noting that FISA required judicial 
involvement because “the courts, from the earliest time, have been regarded as the bulwarks 
of liberty against executive excesses,” and because executive branch officials exercise greater 
self-restraint when forced “to justify [decisions] to someone else”). 
 15. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(a), (d) (West 2015). The FISA Court originally comprised seven 
judges; that number was expanded to eleven in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. Pub. L. No. 
107-56, sec. 208, § 103(a), 115 Stat. 272, 283 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)).  
 16. See Current Membership—Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, U.S. FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE CT., http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/current-membership 
[https://perma.cc/B3D5-8CRX]. The USA FREEDOM Act aims to make more opinions and 
orders public, but FISA Court proceedings will remain secret. USA FREEDOM Act of 
2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, sec. 402, § 602, 129 Stat. 268, 281–82 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1872).   
 17. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(b). 
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1. The FISA Court’s Original Role: Gatekeeper 
Prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in 200118—which amended 
portions of FISA—and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008,19 the nature of FISA’s 
statutory requirements for intelligence collection dictated a narrow scope for the 
court’s operations. Its role was limited to evaluating ex parte applications for 
intelligence collection directed at specific, individual targets.20 Indeed, at the time of 
FISA’s passage, the fact that FISA judges would be “applying the law to the facts of 
a particular case” alleviated concerns that the ex parte nature of the court’s 
proceedings might violate Article III’s case or controversy requirement.21 This is 
what I call the court’s gatekeeper function.  
As gatekeepers, FISA judges’ evaluations of applications for 
intelligence-collection orders are analogous to that of magistrate judges considering 
applications for search warrants or wiretapping authority in the criminal context.22 
The FISA judge must make an independent determination of whether the government 
has met the standard necessary. Before approving electronic surveillance of an 
individual’s communications inside the United States, for example, the FISA judge 
must determine that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the 
surveillance is either a foreign power or its agent, that the places at which the 
surveillance is targeted are used by the foreign power or its agent,23 and that the 
government’s proposed minimization procedures—procedures designed to limit the 
acquisition, retention, and dissemination of nonpublicly available information about 
unconsenting United States persons—satisfy the statutory standard.24 Only after 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
the U.S.C.). 
 19. Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of the U.S.C.). 
 20. The applications, which require the Attorney General’s approval, are generated in the 
National Security Division—a division of the Department of Justice—on behalf of, and in 
coordination with, the agency requesting surveillance authority. Letter from Hon. Reggie B. 
Walton, Presiding Judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to Hon. Patrick J. 
Leahy, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, at 2 n.3 (July 29, 2013).  The NSA 
implements approved requests for signals-intelligence collection—intelligence derived from 
electronic signals and systems, such as communications systems, radars, and weapons 
systems.  NSA, THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY: MISSIONS, AUTHORITIES, OVERSIGHT AND 
PARTNERSHIPS 2 (2013), available at https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/speeches
_testimonies/2013_08_09_the_nsa_story.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LX2-4FW7].   
 21. ELIZABETH GOITEIN & FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT WENT 
WRONG WITH THE FISA COURT 7 (2015). 
 22. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing search and seizure warrants); see 
also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012) (setting out rules governing electronic surveillance in the 
domestic criminal context). 
 23. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(2) (West 2015). 
 24. Id. § 1805(a)(3). Minimization procedures are defined as: 
(1) specific procedures . . . to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit 
the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting 
United States persons . . . ; 
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determining that the government has successfully established each of these elements 
may the court issue an order approving the surveillance.  
The FISA Court’s jurisdiction originally was limited to oversight of electronic 
surveillance, but over time it has expanded to cover physical searches, the use of pen 
registers/trap-and-trace devices (pen/traps),25 and the production of tangible things 
as well.26 Each of these surveillance methods has its own requirements that the 
government must meet.27 Should the judge require additional information to make 
the required determinations, she may require the applicant to furnish it.28  
Evaluation of these types of applications demands a narrow inquiry into whether 
the government has adequately satisfied FISA’s defined requirements. In other 
words, the question is whether the government has included all of the required 
elements in its application and successfully established the necessary standard—for 
example, probable cause, in the case of electronic surveillance. If each requirement 
is met, the FISA judge may issue an order permitting the requested activity.29  
So as originally conceived, a FISA judge’s job is to evaluate government requests 
for authority to collect intelligence from a specific person, and from a specific place 
or communications device, and to ensure that the government’s implementation of 
that authority complies with constitutional, statutory, and judicially ordered limits.30 
In performing this work, FISA judges are primarily assisted not by the usual cadre 
of clerks culled from recent law school graduates, but instead by full-time legal 
counsel who are employees of the Justice Department.  
                                                                                                                 
 
(2) procedures that require that nonpublicly available information, which is not 
foreign intelligence information . . . shall not be disseminated in a manner that 
identifies any United States person, without such person’s consent, unless such 
person’s identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or 
assess its importance; 
(3) . . . procedures that allow for the retention and dissemination of information 
that is evidence of a crime . . . ; and 
(4) . . . procedures that require that no contents of any communication to which 
a United States person is a party shall be disclosed, disseminated, or used for any 
purpose or retained for longer than 72 hours . . . . 
50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(h) (West 2015). 
 25. Pen registers record outgoing communications metadata; trap-and-trace devices 
record the incoming information. See infra note 38. 
 26. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 2015). 
 27. To acquire business records, the government must establish that there are “reasonable 
grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation.” 
Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A). For a pen/trap order, the government must show that the information 
“likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence information . . . or is relevant to an ongoing 
investigation.” 50 U.S.C.A.  § 1842(c)(2) (West 2015). 
 28. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(c) (2012). 
 29. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a) (West 2015). 
 30. For a more detailed discussion of courts’ ex parte review of government applications, 
see Orin S. Kerr, A Rule of Lenity for National Security Surveillance Law, 100 VA. L. REV. 
1513, 1516–18 (2014). 
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2. The FISA Court’s New Role: Rule Maker 
After 9/11, the FISA Court’s role expanded beyond assessing the lawfulness of 
requests for intelligence-collection orders directed at a particular target. Instead, it 
has also been asked to approve a very different kind of surveillance—bulk 
surveillance. Bulk surveillance refers to broad collections programs that do not 
require judicial approval on a case-by-case basis. Rather than determining the 
lawfulness of a particular instance of surveillance, the court pronounces whether an 
entire surveillance program complies with the statute and the Constitution. Issuing 
opinions regarding the validity of programmatic or bulk-collection programs—what 
I refer to as the FISA Court’s rule making—represents a sea change in the court’s 
responsibilities.  
The FISA Court has authorized at least three bulk-collection programs since 
9/11, some more controversial than others. The most controversial is the bulk 
collection of all domestic telephony metadata pursuant to section 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, also known as the FISA business records provision.31 Section 215 
permits the government to collect “any tangible thing[]” that is “relevant” to an 
ongoing investigation.32 Under this provision, the government can 
noncontroversially engage in targeted collection—to access a suspected foreign 
agent’s banking information or credit card records, for example. Under the 
bulk-collection program, however—referred to variously as the section 215 
program, the telephony metadata program, or the telephone bulk-collection 
program—the NSA did not seek out specific items related to a specific target. 
Instead, it collected telecommunications companies’ entire databases of records for 
all domestic phone calls. The information collected included (at a minimum) the 
telephone numbers dialed and the dates, times, and duration of calls.33 The NSA 
could then “query,” or search, this database using terms, known as “seed identifiers” 
(usually phone numbers), in an effort to identify as-yet-unknown terrorist suspects.34 
After the section 215 program became public, President Obama curtailed its scope 
slightly;35 it was then permitted to expire just prior to the passage of the USA 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a)(1) (the FBI “may make an application for an order requiring 
the production of any tangible things . . . for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence 
information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism 
or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person 
is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the 
Constitution”). 
 32. Id. 
 33. ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA 
UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 3 (2013) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION 
SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER]. 
 34. One method through which this is attempted is known as “contact chaining,” or 
analysis of the connections between seed identifiers and others. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES 
OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 
215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE COURT 8–9 (2014) [hereinafter PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT]. 
 35. Remarks on United States Signals Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance Programs, 
2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 6–7 (Jan. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Remarks on United States 
Signals Intelligence]. 
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FREEDOM Act, which enacted several modifications to section 215 itself.36 The 
second bulk-collection program under the FISA Court’s oversight (voluntarily 
discontinued by the executive branch in 2011)37 allowed bulk collection of Internet 
metadata through the use of the FISA pen/trap provision.38 The third bulk-collection 
program, which is currently ongoing, is known as the section 702 program—named 
for a statutory provision of the FISA Amendments Act—which authorizes the bulk 
collection of the contents of communications when the target is reasonably believed 
to be outside the United States, even if the target’s interlocutor is in the United 
States.39 Under these bulk-collection programs, the court need not approve each 
surveillance target; indeed, it likely does not know what the specific targets of 
surveillance will be.  
I am not the first to recognize the novelty of this role. Indeed some have argued 
that adding this function to a court designed to operate only as a mechanism to 
approve individualized surveillance is at best unwise and at worst unconstitutional.40 
But even assuming that assigning the FISA Court a rule making role is neither unwise 
nor unconstitutional, it is crucial to recognize just how different it is. Both former 
FISA Court Judge James Robertson and an independent commission established by 
President Obama in the wake of the Snowden revelations—the President’s Review 
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies (President’s Review 
Group)—noted the change.41 During his time on the court, Robertson explained, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. Jennifer Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, Key Parts of Patriot Act Expire 
Temporarily as Senate Moves Toward Limits on Spying, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/01/us/politics/senate-nsa-surveillance-usa-freedom-act.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/CXZ4-8HH6]; Jennifer Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Surveillance 
in Place Since 9/11 Is Sharply Limited, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com
/2015/06/03/us/politics/senate-surveillance-bill-passes-hurdle-but-showdown-looms.html 
[https://perma.cc/JY2D-8XQ7]. 
 37. See Charlie Savage, File Says N.S.A. Found Way To Replace Email Program, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/us/politics/records-show-email
-analysis-continued-after-nsa-program-ended.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/432R-9PGG].  
 38. Pen registers record outgoing communication information, such as the numbers called 
from a particular phone; trap-and-trace devices record information about incoming 
communications. See generally 50 U.S.C.A. § 1842 (West 2015) (permitting “the installation 
and use of a pen register or trap and trace device for any investigation to obtain foreign 
intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against 
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation 
of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the 
first amendment to the Constitution”). 
 39. Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438–48 (2008) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 40. E.g., GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 21, at 29–32. 
 41. Id. at 30. President Obama established the President’s Review Group, shortly after the 
Snowden leak, to determine how “the United States can employ its technical collection 
capabilities in a manner that optimally protects our national security and advances our foreign 
policy while respecting our commitment to privacy and civil liberties.” Press Release, 
Statement by the Press Secretary on the Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technology (Aug. 27, 2013), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office
/2013/08/27/statement-press-secretary-review-group-intelligence-and-communications-t 
[https://perma.cc/3ARC-YJT5]. 
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judges had no need to issue opinions. “You approved a warrant application or you 
didn’t, period.”42 In other words, the job was limited to gatekeeping. But the 
evolution of both technology and the law has “introduced a new role” for the FISA 
Court, turning it into “something like an administrative agency which makes and 
approves rules for others to follow.”43  
Congress explicitly expanded the FISA Court’s role in the FISA Amendments Act 
of 2008 (FAA), which authorizes electronic surveillance in the absence of the type 
of specific inquiry that had formed the content of a FISA judge’s work for the court’s 
first thirty years.44 Under the FAA, so long as the target is “reasonably believed to 
be located outside the United States” and is not a U.S. person, electronic surveillance 
is permissible.45 But under the FAA, the FISA judge is not asked to determine 
whether the government has established probable cause that the proposed target is 
“reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.” That is to say, the 
judge never determines whether an individual person, or an individual facility, meets 
specific requirements. Instead, the statute requires the judge to review the 
government’s rules for targeting and decide whether those rules, in the abstract, are 
sufficiently likely to yield permissible targets.46 So the question for the FISA judge 
becomes whether the government’s targeting procedures are designed in such a way 
that, when used by the executive branch to select targets, those selected targets are 
“reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.” Similarly, the judge 
must assess whether the government’s proposed rules governing minimization, in the 
abstract, provide sufficient protection to U.S. person information.47 In other words, 
the court must assess the statutory and constitutional sufficiency of the entirety of 
the program, rather than assessing whether any given proposed target falls within 
FISA’s purview. In reviewing whether the government’s proposed targeting and 
minimization procedures were sufficiently likely to yield permissible surveillance 
activities, the court is not adjudicating the validity of an instance of government 
surveillance; it is making and approving rules that government agencies are bound 
to follow. In other words, the FAA forced the FISA Court to become a rule maker.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., WORKSHOP REGARDING 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 
& SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 90 (2013) [hereinafter 
PCLOB WORKSHOP] (statement of Hon. James Robertson). Robertson sat on the FISA Court 
from 2002–2005. Stephen Braun, Former FISA Judge Says Secret Court Is Flawed, YAHOO! 
NEWS (July 9, 2013), available at https://www.yahoo.com/news/former-fisa-judge-says
-secret-court-flawed-201422173.html?ref=gs [https://perma.cc/U4DV-7STH]. 
 43. Id. at 36 (statement of Hon. James Robertson); see also PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON 
INTELLIGENCE AND COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 203 
(2013) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT]. The President’s Review Group’s final 
report made forty-six recommendations, including several specifically related to the FISA 
Court. Id. at 200–08. 
 44. PCLOB WORKSHOP, supra note 42, at 36 (statement of Hon. James Robertson) 
(“Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and introduced a new role for the [FISA 
Court], which was to approve surveillance programs.”). 
 45. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(b)(3), (g)(2) (West 2015). 
 46. Id. § 1881a(i)(2). 
 47. Id. 
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Questions regarding bulk collection posed by the section 215 metadata program 
arose out of both legal and technological changes.48 Prior to 9/11, to secure an order 
under section 215, the government had to provide “specific and articulable facts 
giving reason to believe that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power.”49 In October 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act 
amended the provision so that an order requires merely “a statement of facts showing 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are 
relevant to an authorized investigation.”50 This new version of section 215 seems to 
require individualized surveillance approval, albeit according to a lower standard. 
Unbeknownst to the public, however, the government advocated for a novel legal 
interpretation of section 215 that would allow the NSA to take advantage of 
technological capacities to collect and retain information about a vast number of 
individuals in order to search for information relevant to an investigation later. Thus, 
when faced with the initial government application seeking telecommunications 
companies’ database of records for all domestic phone calls, the FISA judge on duty 
that week had to assess whether section 215 could be interpreted to permit such 
collection.51 In approving the program, the FISA Court ruled that the collection of an 
entire database was permissible under section 215, so long as the government queried 
that information using only search terms for which there was “reasonable articulable 
suspicion” that the term was related to international terrorism.52 Rather than making 
a determination itself with respect to whether each search term satisfied the 
“reasonable articulable suspicion” standard, however, the court ceded to the 
government the authority to make that determination for itself. In other words, it set 
out the rule by which the government was authorized to access the bulk data and left 
it to the government to follow that rule.  
A similar question had previously arisen in the context of the bulk collection of 
Internet communications metadata under FISA’s pen/trap provision. Recognizing 
that it was asking the court to do something unusual, the government submitted 
lengthy briefs setting out its desired interpretation of the pen/trap provision as part 
of its initial application for approval.53 And the assigned FISA judge issued a lengthy 
opinion explaining her reasoning in approving the practice.54 So both the government 
and the FISA Court itself have recognized that the post-9/11 surveillance statutes, or 
the government’s interpretation of those statutes, have resulted in a massive 
modification of the FISA Court’s responsibilities. Despite these substantive 
modifications to the court’s responsibilities, however, there have been only minor 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. Kerr, supra note 30, at 1522 (stating that because surveillance agencies are “at the 
leading edge” of quickly evolving technology, ambiguities in surveillance statutes are likely 
to develop). 
 49. 50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B) (2000). 
 50. 50 U.S.C.  § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 51. Kerr, supra note 30, at 1528–30.  
 52. See infra text accompanying notes 101–03. 
 53. Memorandum of Law and Fact in Support of Application for Pen Registers and Trap 
and Trace Devices for Foreign Intelligence Purposes, In re [REDACTED], No. PR/TT 
[REDACTED] (FISA Ct. 2004). 
 54. Opinion and Order, In re [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED] (FISA Ct. July 
14, 2004) [hereinafter Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion]. 
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changes to the court’s procedures. As a result, a court designed to accomplish one 
purpose is now being asked to add another, but without any consideration of whether 
the court’s design can accommodate that new purpose. As I discuss in Part II.B, it 
turns out that the FISA Court’s original design is not well suited to the new task of 
rule making.  
B. Critiques of the FISA Court 
Critiques of the FISA Court have come from a spectrum of sources—academic 
commentators, privacy and civil liberties advocates, government review boards, and 
even former members of the court itself. Each of them has consistently focused on a 
similar set of concerns related to the court’s operation—the most frequent points 
focus on the court’s nonadversarial nature and the resulting scarcity of appeals as 
well as its lack of transparency. Other concerns surround the way the FISA judges 
are selected and whether the court has the information it needs. 
1. The FISA Court’s Proceedings Are Not Adversarial 
Prior to 2007, FISA contemplated no adversarial proceedings at all. But Congress 
seems to have recognized that it was changing the FISA Court’s role when it included 
in the FISA Amendments Act a provision under which recipients of FISA Court 
orders requiring them to provide information about their subscribers could challenge 
those orders in an adversarial proceeding.55 Because the court would no longer 
provide a judicial check on the executive branch’s targeting decisions, Congress 
looked for another means to challenge executive branch actions. This mechanism has 
proved toothless, however, because it allows recipients of orders (communications 
service providers) to challenge them, but not targets of orders (those being 
surveilled). Service providers rarely will have the incentive necessary to prompt them 
to challenge government orders. To date, just one service provider—Yahoo—has 
availed itself of this opportunity pursuant to the Protect America Act of 2007, the 
precursor to the FISA Amendments Act, and none has done so under the FISA 
Amendments Act itself. Congress did not include even this watered-down adversarial 
process in the FISA Court’s other rule-making contexts. In addition to this one 
adversarial matter, there have been a handful of instances in which a FISA judge has 
entertained various motions from nongovernmental entities or agreed to permit some 
to participate as amici.56 The frequency with which the FISA Court has overseen 
adversarial proceedings is thus vanishingly small. 
The FISA Court has been strongly criticized for its dearth of adversarial 
proceedings. Adversarial proceedings are the norm in the United States’ judicial 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(h)(4)(A) (West 2015) (providing that communication service 
providers who receive an order under section 702 “may file a petition to modify or set aside 
such directive” with the FISA Court). The provision was initially enacted in the Protect 
America Act of 2007 (PAA). Pub. L. No. 110-55, sec. 2, § 105B, 121 Stat. 552, 552 (2007) 
(allowing the government to acquire “foreign intelligence information concerning persons 
reasonably believed to be outside the United States”) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805b) 
(repealed). When the FISA Amendments Act took the PAA’s place, it retained this provision. 
 56. Letter from Hon. Reggie B. Walton, supra note 20, at 9–10 (listing instances). 
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system57 based on the idea that “the adversary system is an engine of truth [that 
assumes] that judges are in a better position to find the right answer . . . when they 
hear competing views.”58 FISA judges, by contrast, are not provided with 
counterarguments or critiques of the government’s position. There is no institutional 
mechanism for pointing to flaws or weaknesses in the government’s legal 
interpretations. According to an in-depth study of the section 215 program by the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), an independent government 
agency created to examine the effects of counterterrorism policy on civil liberties,59 
“there is a growing consensus that the ex parte approach is not the right model” for 
at least some subset of applications for collection of “the communications of many 
people who have no apparent connection to terrorism.”60 These critiques are not 
aimed solely at FISA Court outcomes. Even assuming no outcomes changed, 
opinions from judges with the benefit of hearing arguments on all sides would be 
more thorough, thoughtful, and fully developed.61 Moreover, as the result of effective 
procedures, the opinions would command more legitimacy. 
Another concern regarding the lack of adversaries in the FISA Court’s operations 
is the dearth of appeals of pro-government decisions.62 Prior to the passage of the 
USA FREEDOM Act, which attempts to add some adversarial process to the FISA 
Court’s operations, an appellate panel would almost never review FISA Court 
decisions unless the initial decision went against the government—a rarity.63 The 
government has always had the power to appeal a denial of an application to the 
FISA Court of Review, and, in the event that the FISA Court of Review rules against 
the government (an event that, as far as the public knows, has never come to pass), 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. Kerr, supra note 30, at 1516 (citing Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public 
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1285–86 (1976)). 
 58. PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 203; see also Peter Margulies, 
Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign Content Collection 
After Snowden, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 51–57 (2014) (arguing that an adversarial process would 
improve the FISA Court’s reasoning). 
 59. The PCLOB is an independent executive branch agency established by the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. Pub. L. No. 110-53, 
sec.  801, 121 Stat. 266, 352 (2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
The board has five members, who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 
The board’s enabling statute vests it with the authority to (1) review executive branch 
counterterrorism actions, ensuring that the need for such actions is balanced with the need to 
protect privacy and civil liberties, and (2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately 
considered in the development and implementation of counterterrorism laws, regulations, and 
policies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee (2012).  
 60. PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 183–84 (italics in original).  
 61. James G. Carr, A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/opinion/a-better-secret-court.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc
/9AKS-SZ8C]. 
 62. Id. 
 63. For the USA FREEDOM Act’s modifications in this area, see infra Part III.B. In 
the court’s rare adversarial proceedings, the nongovernmental party may appeal adverse 
decisions to the FISA Court of Review and petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. 50 
U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(6) (2012). 
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to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.64 There is no adverse party able 
to lodge an appeal when an order is granted. And except in the rare context of a 
service provider’s challenge to an order under the FISA Amendments Act or the 
participation of an amicus, at no step in the process does the reviewing court hear 
from a party other than the government.  
2. The FISA Court Lacks Transparency  
 The second common critique of the FISA Court has been its lack of 
transparency—another issue that the USA FREEDOM Act takes on.65 Proponents of 
reform have argued that, like adversarial proceedings, transparency of judicial action 
is the norm and that exposing judicial proceedings to public scrutiny draws attention 
to flawed or unpersuasive rulings as well as potentially undesirable developments in 
the law.66 Without transparency, the check on judicial action that comes from issuing 
a public, reasoned decision is absent. Moreover, when a judge’s work will not be 
subject to public scrutiny and critique, it becomes easier for the judge to engage in 
incomplete, unconvincing, or otherwise flawed analysis.67 Finally, citizens are more 
likely to trust in their government’s good faith when a full account of its activities is 
available.  
Historically, the FISA Court has lacked the benefits of transparency on several 
levels, only some of which are affected by the USA FREEDOM Act. In the United 
States, judicial proceedings are, as a rule, open to the public.68 The FISA Court’s 
rules, by contrast, explicitly provide that hearings “must be ex parte and conducted 
within the Court’s secure facility,” which is accessible only by individuals with the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 103(b), 92 Stat. 
1783, 1788 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803). 
 65. See infra Part III. 
 66. See, e.g., The Administration’s Use of FISA Authorities, Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Jameel Jaffer, Deputy Legal Director, 
ACLU); PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 205–07; Alan Butler, Standing 
Up to Clapper: How To Increase Transparency and Oversight of FISA Surveillance, 48 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 55, 86–88 (2013). 
 67. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1609, 1640 (2012) (noting, in the context of criminal warrants, “police officers, cognizant 
of the fact that their warrant applications will be scrutinized carefully, will not bother filing weak 
applications”); Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive 
Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 833–56 (2013) (defining 
and providing examples of how interbranch interactions affect national security law and policy 
making); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–6 (1984) (positing that, inter alia, litigants who do not expect to prevail at 
trial are more likely to avoid trial by settling). 
 68. E.g., Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (holding that 
“the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment” 
(footnote omitted)); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (holding that prior 
restraints on media coverage of criminal trial are unconstitutional); Vincent Blasi, The 
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521. 
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appropriate security clearance.69 Thus, all but a handful of proceedings are seen only 
by a limited number of government officials.  
Perhaps more importantly, prior to the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act, FISA 
Court opinions also lacked transparency and were rarely released beyond the relevant 
congressional oversight committees. Indeed, prior to the Snowden revelations, none 
of the documents setting out arguments for the lawfulness of the government’s 
bulk-collection programs were public. Since neither the FISA Court’s orders nor its 
opinions are available, the American people know neither how the court is 
interpreting the law70 nor what programs the government has implemented under its 
FISA authorities.71  
3. The FISA Court Lacks Diversity  
A third target of criticism is the method through which FISA judges are chosen, 
an area left untouched by the USA FREEDOM Act. FISA clearly anticipated that a 
relatively diverse set of judges would serve on the court at any one time. The eleven 
judges on the court must be selected from at least seven different judicial circuits72 
and must serve staggered terms,73 so that the judges will have differing levels of 
FISA experience. In addition, a judge may sit on the FISA Court for only one term,74 
a rule that ensures that its ranks will be constantly refreshed from a broad pool of 
federal judges. Moreover, the constant turnover engendered by the seven-year terms 
ensures that as the Chief Justiceship changes hands, each new Chief Justice will have 
the opportunity to appoint his own selections to the FISA Court.  
Despite these various rules, critics highlight the FISA Court’s lack of diversity. 
Of the judges who currently serve, only one is a Democratic appointee to the bench.75 
In fact, as of 2014, only three of the twenty judges appointed to the FISA Court and 
the FISA Court of Review over the past decade have been Democratic appointees to 
the bench.76 The President’s Review Group argues that lack of party diversity can 
have predictable substantive effects. Republican- and Democratic-appointed judges 
often have divergent views on issues that the court often faces, such as “privacy, civil 
liberties, and claims of national security.”77 Thus, the President’s Review Group’s 
report asserts, there is a “legitimate reason for concern if, as is now the case, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. FISA CT. R. 17(b) (italics in original). 
 70. The Administration’s Use of FISA Authorities, supra note 67, at 84–85 (statement of 
Jameel Jaffer, Deputy Legal Director, ACLU); Butler, supra note 67, at 86–88.  
 71. Butler, supra note 67, at 83–86; see also AM. BAR ASS’N., REPORT TO THE HOUSE 
OF DELEGATES  (2002) (calling for “an annual statistical report on FISA investigations, 
comparable to the reports prepared for the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
. . . regarding the use of Federal wiretap authority”). 
 72. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(a)(1) (West 2015). 
 73. Id. § 1803(d). 
 74. Id.  
 75.  Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional 
Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 825 (2014); Current Membership—Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, supra note 16.  
 76. Donohue, supra note 76, at 825. 
 77. PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 207–08. 
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judges on the [FISA Court] turn out to come disproportionately from either 
Republican or Democratic appointees.”78 FISA judges are also likely to come from 
a background in prosecution or law enforcement—only one FISA judge has had 
significant experience as a public defender.79 Moreover, given the young age at 
which most Chief Justices are selected and the concomitant length of their tenure on 
the Supreme Court, one person is granted the power to select all members of this 
important court for decades at a time.80  
Proponents of the argument that the FISA Court is merely a rubber stamp for the 
government often blame the makeup of the court for this phenomenon. According to 
this argument, the court does not engage in meaningful gatekeeping when reviewing 
government applications, but instead simply approves them, providing the 
appearance of oversight without its substance. The court’s rate of approval, which is 
over ninety-nine percent, is frequently provided as evidence of the court’s status as 
a paper tiger.81  
4. The FISA Court Judges Lack Necessary Information 
One criticism of the FISA Court that has received insufficient attention to date is 
its potential for information deficits. The court potentially suffers from a dearth of 
two types of information—technical expertise regarding the government’s 
surveillance capabilities and activities, and information regarding the ways in which 
the government is actually implementing its surveillance authority.  
The surveillance programs that the court oversees employ complex and quickly 
evolving technological tools. The mechanics of these tools are not only highly 
technical, but also integral to mechanisms put in place to prevent misuse of 
surveillance powers or the resulting information.82 Observers have pointed out that, 
to the extent these internal controls are based on an understanding of the structure of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. Id. at 208. 
 79. Russell Wheeler, The Changing Composition of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court and What if Anything To Do About It, LAWFARE RES. PAPER SERIES 1, 8 (2014). 
 80. Since 1953, the United States has had just four Chief Justices—Earl Warren 
(1953–1969), Warren E. Burger (1969–1986), William Rehnquist (1986–2005), and John 
Roberts (2005–present). See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
SUPREME CT. OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/2U83-TZ9X] (listing all Chief and Associate Justices as well as their 
dates of service). 
 81. Over its first two and a half decades, the FISA Court approved nearly every single 
application without modification. 1 DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL 
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS 469 (2d ed. 2012). Between 1979 and 2003, it 
denied only three out of 16,450 applications. LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF 
COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS, AND LIBERTY 232 (2008). And with respect to 
applications for section 215 orders specifically, “[i]t appears that [the FISA Court] has never 
denied [one.] That is, of 751 applications since 2005, all 751 have been granted.” Donohue, 
supra note 76, at 834 (emphasis in original). 
 82. See John Reed, Chris Soghoian on What’s Wrong With the Debate on Section 215, 
JUST SECURITY, (June 1, 2015, 2:51 pm), http://justsecurity.org/23369/chris-soghoian-wrong
-focusing-section-215/ [https://perma.cc/GB3L-54TB] (decrying lack of technological 
knowledge informing the surveillance debate). 
2016] THE TWO FACES OF THE FISA COURT 1207 
 
databases, the querying process, and any algorithms in use, individual FISA judges 
may not be able to sufficiently understand the technology to perform effective 
oversight.83  
FISA judges’ need for timely and accurate information regarding how the 
government is conducting surveillance has unfortunately not been a topic of public 
discussion. Such information is particularly important to effective gatekeeping—no 
overseer can assess the government’s compliance absent accurate information 
about what the government is doing. Yet the court has been surprised time and 
again by aspects of executive-branch collection activities.84 Failure to address 
deficiencies in the flow of information to the FISA Court will undermine the 
success of any other reforms, as the court can only operate effectively if it has all 
the relevant facts before it.  
II. REALITIES OF THE FISA COURT 
This Part will review the FISA Court’s performance in the context of 
bulk-collection programs with an eye to whether the preceding criticisms are 
warranted. It will argue in Part II.A that the FISA Court has taken seriously its role 
as gatekeeper, engaging in active oversight and at times imposing meaningful checks 
on executive-branch surveillance activities. Part II.B demonstrates that the court’s 
performance as rule maker, however, has not exhibited similar effectiveness. Instead, 
the FISA Court’s bulk-collection approvals fail to grapple meaningfully with the 
implications of the government’s requests. Moreover, they have uncritically adopted 
the government’s legal arguments, all of which deserve rigorous analysis and some 
of which are very difficult to square with the relevant statutory text.  
A. Strong Gatekeeper Oversight 
This Part will detail the ways in which the FISA Court has, contrary to generalized 
critiques of the court, aggressively exercised its gatekeeping power to oversee FISA 
programs. The power to impose gatekeeping limits on the government’s FISA 
powers derives from a variety of sources of authorization and can be deployed at 
multiple points during the course of the application, approval, and implementation 
process. The most notable source of authority is, of course, Article III of the 
Constitution, which vests the “judicial Power of the United States” in federal 
courts.85 Inherent in this judicial power is a court’s equitable power to protect its 
“proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging [its] traditional 
responsibilities,”86 and the FISA Court is no different from any other Article III court 
in this regard.87 FISA itself recognizes these inherent powers when it specifies that 
the statute should not “be construed to reduce or contravene the inherent authority of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 205; Donohue, supra note 
76, at 821–22 (arguing that the dearth of technological knowledge is similarly problematic 
when it comes to congressional overseers). 
 84. See infra Part II.A. 
 85. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 86. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996). 
 87. See In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (FISA Ct. 2007).  
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the court . . . to determine or enforce compliance with an order or a rule.”88 The FISA 
Court Rules of Procedure also reinforce the idea that FISA judges may use their 
equitable power by providing, for example, that judges may collect any information 
they deem relevant to carrying out their obligations.89  
FISA judges have put these equitable powers to work when the government 
initially applies for surveillance authority, when the government seeks to renew an 
authority, and in response to government noncompliance. Whether those 
mechanisms suffice to bar unlawful government activity is a separate, and more 
debatable, question.90 
1. Government Applications as Gatekeeping Opportunities 
When acting as gatekeeper to the FISA surveillance powers, a critical moment 
comes at the beginning of the process—the FISA judge’s consideration of a 
government application. The process of applying for a FISA Court order is designed 
to be much more than a rubber-stamping operation. It is an iterative process in which 
the presiding judge, members of the FISA Court staff, and government lawyers 
responsible for preparing applications engage in a dialogue. In the course of 
considering each individual application, a judge might insist on additional 
information from the government, require a hearing on a particular issue of fact or 
law, modify the government’s proposed order, or impose additional conditions or 
limitations on what the proposed order permits the government to do.91 
When the government seeks approval of a request for targeted, rather than bulk, 
surveillance, the FISA Court has a clear opportunity to exercise its gatekeeping 
powers.  Just as a magistrate judge examines an application for a search warrant, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(h) (West 2015). 
 89. FISA CT. R. 5(c) (“The Judge before whom a matter is pending may order a party to 
furnish any information that the Judge deems necessary.”). 
 90. Some critiques of the FISA approval process have identified a concern not addressed 
in this Article—the infrequency of collateral review of FISA surveillance orders. There is a 
robust regime available for challenging criminal warrants—an individual can challenge the 
validity of a warrant by moving to bar the government from introducing at his trial evidence 
that resulted from the warrant, or by bringing a civil damages claim against the law 
enforcement officials who carried out the allegedly invalid warrant. FISA orders, by contrast, 
are much more insulated from collateral attack. First, they are much less likely to lead to 
criminal prosecution, so the opportunity for a suppression motion is rare. Second, when they 
do lead to evidence used in a criminal trial, the defendant’s ability to challenge their validity 
has been narrowly constrained by the federal courts. E.g., United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 
479 (7th Cir. 2014) (limiting defendant’s access to FISA materials when challenging an 
order’s validity). Finally, courts have proved hostile to damages claims based on FISA 
violations. E.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Obama, 705 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir. 
2012) (holding United States immune from suit asserting violations of FISA). While the 
paucity of opportunity for collateral review of FISA orders is highly problematic, critiques on 
this basis are not critiques of the FISA Court’s gatekeeping performance. Rather, they are 
challenges to the lack of mechanisms for challenging FISA Court orders once they have been 
implemented. See GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 21, at 34 (listing the barriers to challenging 
FISA Court orders). 
 91. Letter from Hon. Reggie B. Walton, supra note 20. 
2016] THE TWO FACES OF THE FISA COURT 1209 
 
FISA judge examines the government’s targeted surveillance application to ensure 
that it complies with all statutory and constitutional requirements. Indeed, it is this 
gatekeeping role for which the FISA Court was created.  And we have seen the FISA 
Court operate effectively in this capacity. The FISA Court “twice refused to authorize 
Section 215 orders [by the FBI] based on concerns that the investigation was 
premised on protected First Amendment activity.”92 In other words, when the 
government’s proposed surveillance activities threatened the constitutionally 
protected rights of American citizens, the FISA Court refused to provide 
authorization. 
Perhaps counterintuitively, however, the court engages in gatekeeping activity 
even in the rule-making context.  Take for example the government’s application for 
the collection of Internet data in bulk under FISA’s pen/trap provision.93  In that 
instance, the court is being asked to make rules—to determine whether the statute 
can be interpreted to authorize the government’s desired activity. It is facing a 
question of first impression and determining whether the statute’s authorization 
lawfully extends to the new circumstances that the government presents.  It is rule 
making like any common law court. What is less evident is the gatekeeping aspect 
to this process.  Again, the initial bulk Internet collection application is an example.  
The pen/trap provision provides that the judge must enter an order approving the use 
of a pen/trap device if the judge finds, inter alia, that the application includes a 
certification from the government that it is likely to collect foreign intelligence 
information or is relevant to investigations of international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities.94 The government argued that this language meant that “the 
Court’s exclusive function” was “to verify that [the certification] contains the words 
required” by the statute;95 in other words, that the provision reduced the approving 
judge’s role to that of ensuring the government had checked off all the required 
boxes. FISA Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly was concerned, however, about the 
breadth of the collection contemplated by the proposed authorization and rejected 
the government’s view on this point. She refused to concede that “FISA prohibits the 
Court from engaging in any substantive review of [the government’s] certification.”96 
“[A]uthorizing the Court to issue an order when a certification is made,” she pointed 
out, “and requiring it to do so without resolving doubts about the correctness of the 
certification, are quite different.”97 So despite statutory language that arguably 
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF 
SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS IN 2006, at 73 (2008). The FBI subsequently 
issued National Security Letters (NSLs) to obtain this information built on the same premise 
rejected by the court, thereby executing an end run around the court. Id. NSLs are 
administrative subpoenas that the government can use to demand information without judicial 
approval.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709 (West 2015). 
 93.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 94. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1842(c)(2) (West 2015). 
 95. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 26. 
 96. Id. at 26; see also Memorandum Opinion at 8 n.10, In re [REDACTED], No. PR/TT 
[REDACTED] (FISA Ct. 2010) [hereinafter Bates Memorandum Opinion] (reauthorizing bulk 
collection of Internet metadata under FISA’s pen/trap provision).  
 97. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 27 n.19 (emphasis in 
original). 
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requires otherwise, the FISA judge reserved the right to look behind a government 
certification to assess whether its contents were accurate. In other words, separate 
and apart from making a new rule authorizing bulk collection under the pen/trap 
statute, the court used the order in which that rule was first announced as an 
opportunity to engage in gatekeeping as well, insisting on making an independent 
determination of whether the government had satisfied the requirements of that 
newly minted rule. 
2. Information as a Gatekeeping Tool 
A tool that FISA judges often have put to use in their efforts at ongoing oversight 
is the authority to demand additional information from the government at all stages 
of the application and renewal process. Some of the court’s demands for information 
in the rule-making role are explicitly designed to facilitate subsequent gatekeeping.  
When setting out the parameters of the government’s new authority, the court often 
includes in its orders provisions that ensure that it will continue to receive 
information about the government’s activities—thereby allowing ongoing 
oversight—even after a surveillance order has been issued. To this end, judges have 
sometimes imposed specific, extrastatutory information-sharing prerequisites for 
reauthorization of a particular order. In her original order authorizing the pen/trap 
bulk-collection program, for example, Judge Kollar-Kotelly specified that each 
government application for reauthorization had to include “a report discussing 
queries that have been made since the prior application,” as well as the NSA’s 
application of court-imposed limits on the use of the information.98 Similarly, the 
FISA Court’s orders have always required that any renewal application for the 
section 215 bulk telephony-metadata collection “include a report on the 
implementation of the Court’s prior orders.”99 
At other times, the use of information requests is retrospective.  This was true, for 
example, of demands for additional information that came in response to several 
instances in which the NSA failed to comply with various FISA Court orders. These 
instances of noncompliance—frequently long-standing and systemic 
noncompliance—do not appear to have been the result of intentional misconduct; 
they have been significant nonetheless. One such instance came in the context of 
Judge Reggie Walton’s oversight of the government’s use of both the telephone 
metadata and the pen/trap databases. The FISA Court’s orders authorizing these 
bulk-collection programs required that an NSA official determine that there was 
“reasonable articulable suspicion” that any seed identifier used to query the database 
is “associated with” a particular terrorist organization.100 This requirement is known 
as the “RAS standard.” In early January 2009—more than three years after the 
program was initiated—Justice Department officials learned that the NSA had 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. Id. at 86. 
 99. E.g., Order at 6, In re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 
08-13 (FISA Ct. March 2, 2009) [hereinafter March 2, 2009, Order]. 
 100. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 83–84; see also Order 
Regarding Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15, 2009 at 2, In re 
Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Jan. 28, 2009) 
[hereinafter Jan. 28, 2009, Order] (describing the RAS standard). 
2016] THE TWO FACES OF THE FISA COURT 1211 
 
regularly queried the telephony metadata database using seeds that had not been 
deemed to meet the RAS standard.101 As it turned out, “nearly ninety percent of the 
queries to the bulk dataset” up to that point had used non-RAS-approved numbers.102 
Compounding the problem, the NSA had, in its regular reauthorization applications, 
consistently provided the FISA Court with an inaccurate description of this querying 
process.103 As Judge Walton subsequently pointed out, this meant that “since the 
earliest days of the [FISA Court]-authorized collection of call-detail records by the 
NSA, the NSA ha[d] on a daily basis” used the database in a manner “prohibited by 
the governing minimization procedures under each of the relevant Court orders.”104  
In response to the government’s “flagrant violation[s]” of the FISA Court’s 
orders, Judge Walton ordered the government—through declarants “of sufficient 
stature that they have the authority to speak on behalf of the Executive Branch”—to 
provide detailed information about the telephony metadata program.105 In particular, 
he sought the government’s input “to help the Court assess whether the Orders issued 
in this docket should be modified or rescinded; whether other remedial steps should 
be directed; and whether the Court should take action regarding persons responsible 
for any misrepresentations to the Court or violations of its Orders.”106 In addition, 
the order posed specific questions about the program and the related compliance 
incidents for the government to answer, such as who was responsible for the 
noncompliance, how long it went on, how it was discovered, and why existing 
oversight mechanisms failed to identify the problem earlier.107 
In addition, recognizing that the pen/trap metadata program operated in a similar 
manner, Judge Walton proactively asked the government to investigate whether the 
same problems also existed with respect to the pen/trap data. As it turned out, the 
pen/trap metadata had also been queried using non-RAS-approved seeds.108 
In response to these January 2009 discoveries, Judge Walton required the 
government to provide him with a report on the results of an “end-to-end review” of 
NSA’s handling of bulk-collection material.109 Judge Walton’s order specified that 
the report should include any additional noncompliance that was discovered as a 
result of the end-to-end review, “discussion of the steps taken to remedy . . . 
non-compliance,” and “minimization and oversight procedures the government 
propose[d]” to apply to the program going forward.110  
Additional compliance problems prompted the court to employ even more 
assertive gatekeeping information demands. In addition to its failure to comply with 
the RAS standard, the NSA also reported improper access to the telephony metadata 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. See Jan. 28, 2009, Order, supra note 101, at 2.  
 102. Donohue, supra note 76, at 811–12. 
 103. Supplemental Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 16–19, In re 
Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 25, 2009) 
[hereinafter Declaration of Lt. Gen. Alexander]. 
 104. March 2, 2009, Order, supra note 100, at 4–5. 
 105. Jan. 28, 2009, Order, supra note 101, at 4–5.   
 106. Id. at 2. 
 107. Id. at 2–4. 
 108. See Bates Memorandum Opinion, supra note 97, at 15. 
 109. E.g., Declaration. of Lt. Gen. Alexander, supra note 104, at 2. 
 110. March 2, 2009, Order, supra note 100, at 20.  
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database111 and failure to comply with FISA Court orders regarding the use and 
dissemination of information gathered through the bulk-collection programs.112 To 
address the violation of dissemination rules, the court insisted on a weekly reporting 
requirement. Every seven days, the NSA was obligated to submit to the FISA Court 
a list of each incidence of dissemination of information outside the NSA from the 
metadata databases for the preceding week.113 And because its previous efforts to 
ensure compliance had not succeeded in preventing unauthorized dissemination of 
database information, the FISA Court took more drastic information-collection 
action in that context as well.114 Not satisfied in this instance with demanding a 
written submission, Judge Walton required NSA and the Justice Department’s 
National Security Division officials to appear for a hearing “to inform the Court more 
fully of the scope and circumstances of the incidents” and “to allow the Court [to] 
assess whether the Orders issued in this docket should be modified or rescinded and 
whether other remedial steps should be imposed.”115 At this hearing, Judge Walton 
ordered the government to submit a report explaining how it had handled the 
compliance issues that had been discovered.116 Not satisfied with the level of detail 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. Improper access to the telephony metadata database had been a persistent problem. 
Id. at 9 (over two dozen analysts had queried the telephony metadata database for several 
days in April 2008 “without being aware they were doing so” (emphasis omitted)); Donohue, 
supra note 76, at 815. NSA responded by “suspending . . . access pending additional training” 
and changing the access tool to require acknowledgment of access to metadata. March 2, 
2009, Order, supra note 100, at 9–10. An audit revealed that as late as February 2009 analysts 
continued to query the records using seeds that were not RAS-approved. Id. at 10; 
Declaration of Lt. Gen. Alexander, supra note 104, at 8; PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra 
note 34, at 51. 
 112. In June 2009, the government reported to the court that the “unminimized results of 
some queries of metadata [redacted text] had been ‘uploaded [by NSA] into a database to 
which other intelligence agencies . . . had access,’” which “may have resulted in the 
dissemination of U.S. person information in violation” of minimization policy as well as the 
Court’s orders. Order at 5, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an 
Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 09-06 (FISA 
Ct. June 22, 2009) [hereinafter FBI Application Order] (alteration in original) (describing May 
29, 2009 order). 
 113. Id. at 7. This requirement was later relaxed to every thirty days. See Bates 
Memorandum Opinion, supra note 97, at 95. 
 114. One NSA analyst, for example, forwarded the results to other NSA analysts, at least 
some of whom had not received “appropriate and adequate briefings” about the relevant 
restrictions on the use and dissemination of the metadata. Order Regarding Further 
Compliance Incidents at 3, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an 
Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 09-13 (FISA 
Ct. Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter FBI Application Further Compliance Order] (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Coming on the heels of a purportedly thorough review of the section 
215 program, these revelations “deeply troubled” the court. Id. at 4. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Supplemental Opinion and Order at 6–7, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], 
No. BR 09-15 (FISA Ct. Nov. 5, 2009) [hereinafter FBI Application Supplemental Order]. 
Telephony metadata was disseminated to analysts not trained to receive it, and analysts had 
queried the database using selectors for which there had been, but was no longer, RAS. Id. at 3–4. 
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provided in that initial report, the judge required yet another report, this time 
specifying particular information that it must include.117 
So FISA judges have been quite diligent in seeking information about the 
bulk-collection programs they are overseeing, particularly when they learn of 
instances in which the government acted in violation of their orders. This information 
seeking itself aids in the court’s gatekeeper duties. Asking the government to provide 
information sends a clear signal that the court is paying attention. It also forces the 
government to be more diligent in its implementation of the court’s orders. But the 
FISA Court does not limit its gatekeeping activity to collecting information. It goes 
on to make use of the information gleaned from these demands to address concerns 
that the information reveals.  
3. Other Gatekeeping Tools  
There are other tools the judges have used to either facilitate or engage in 
gatekeeping. One is to require minimization or “minimization-like” procedures. 
While section 215 has always statutorily required the government to employ 
appropriate minimization procedures, the same was not true of FISA’s pen/trap 
provision prior to the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act.118 Yet the FISA Court 
imposed mandatory minimization-like procedures on this data anyway, as a 
safeguard for concerns arising from the breadth of the collection.119 These 
minimization-like procedures included, inter alia, an enhanced oversight role for the 
NSA’s Office of the General Counsel as well as requirements that the NSA label the 
data as bulk collected, make it available only to trained analysts, and query the 
database only on seeds that meet the RAS standard.120  
Enhanced minimization was also the FISA Court’s means of remedying 
overcollection under section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.121 Section 702 
permits the collection of the content of electronic communications so long as the 
target of the surveillance is “reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
States.”122 Due to the technical means by which communications traverse the 
Internet, however, the NSA was collecting vast numbers of purely domestic 
communications.123 The scope of this domestic collection, the FISA Court held, 
exceeded the authority conferred by statute and violated the Fourth Amendment.124 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. Id. at 6–7. 
 118. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, sec. 202, § 402(a), 129 Stat. 268, 
277–78 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1842) (adding a requirement that the Attorney General 
“safeguard nonpublicly available information concerning United States persons that is 
collected through the use of a [pen/trap device]”). 
 119. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 68, 82–87; see also Bates 
Memorandum Opinion, supra note 97, at 82.  
 120. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 69 n.50, 83–85. 
 121. See Memorandum Opinion at 16 n.14, In re [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED] 
(FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Oct. 3, 2011, Memorandum Opinion] (noting the 
government’s repeated substantial misrepresentations of its collection programs). 
 122. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012). 
 123. Oct. 3, 2011, Memorandum Opinion, supra note 122, at 16 n.14, 33–35.  
 124. Id. at 62–63, 78–79. 
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To bring the program into compliance with the statute and the Constitution, Judge 
Bates insisted that the government augment its minimization efforts with respect to 
this material, and he refused to reauthorize the program until he had approved the 
government’s amended minimization procedures.125  
Restricting collection and dissemination decisions to a limited roster of properly 
trained officials is another tactic the court has invoked. Both the initial determination 
that RAS exists for a particular seed and the determination that minimization 
requirements have been met before any metadata is disseminated must be made by 
one of a small number of specified officials.126 In addition, upon discovering the 
NSA’s longstanding failure to comply with the rules regarding the dissemination of 
U.S. person information, the court insisted that NSA employees responsible for 
handling this sensitive information undergo supplemental training with respect to the 
applicable rules.127  
An oversight measure that has proved effective in preventing systemic 
overcollection or overdissemination is that of requiring periodic spot checks. An 
early noncompliance incident in the pen/trap bulk-collection program prompted the 
court to impose requirements that the Justice Department’s National Security 
Division and the General Counsel of the NSA spot check of sample data, “at least 
twice during the 90-day authorized period of surveillance,” to be sure the program 
complied with court requirements.128 At least once, both of those offices also had to 
review a sample of the RAS approvals for selection terms. And the NSA had to 
regularly provide the FISA Court with a report detailing the queries made since the 
last report submitted to the court, describing the NSA’s implementation of 
procedures to access the metadata and any proposed changes in the collection or use 
of the metadata.129 To facilitate these sorts of periodic checks, the FISA Court has 
required an auditable record of NSA access to bulk-records databases.130 One of these 
spot checks revealed that, from the time of the bulk-pen/trap program’s initial 
authorization in 2004, certain “categories” of information not authorized for 
collection were nonetheless collected continuously.131 The problem eluded detection 
by the NSA’s end-to-end review or any other oversight mechanism. It was only 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. Id. at 29, 79–80 (describing modifications to minimization procedures). 
 126. Primary Order at 6–9, 13, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for 
an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 09-13 
(FISA Ct. Sept. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Sept. 3, 2009, Primary Order]. 
 127. Id. at 14–15. 
 128. Bates Memorandum Opinion, supra note 97, at 13 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Sept. 3, 2009, Primary Order, supra note 127, at 16 (describing 
limits). 
 129. Sept. 3, 2009, Primary Order, supra note 127, at 18. Initially, this report was required 
when the government applied for reauthorization of the program; eventually, it was required 
every 30 days. Primary Order at 16, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-80 
(FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Apr. 25, 2013, Primary Order]. 
 130. E.g., Judge Kollar-Kotelly Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 83. Access to bulk 
telephony metadata “for foreign intelligence analysis purposes” must also include an auditable 
record. Apr. 25, 2013, Primary Order, supra note 130, at 7. 
 131. Bates Memorandum Opinion, supra note 97, at 20–22. 
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through the FISA Court–imposed spot-checking requirement that the overcollection 
finally came to light in 2010 and was remedied. 
The most intrusive oversight tool that a FISA judge has employed was the 
complete suspension of a program absent judicial approval of each individual query. 
When it became clear to Judge Walton that the problem of querying the bulk records 
databases using non-RAS-approved seeds was a systemic one, he barred the NSA 
from running unsupervised queries altogether.132 From March until September of 
2009, Judge Walton ordered that the government seek judicial approval for each 
individual query of the telephony metadata.133 Under these rules, the NSA could only 
access metadata “through a motion that the Court authorize querying of the BR 
metadata for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence on a case-by-case basis [that 
identifies] the telephone identifier for which access is sought [and] provide[s] the 
factual basis for the NSA’s determination that the [RAS] standard has been met.”134 
After the NSA completed its end-to-end review, Judge Walton discontinued this 
requirement and reauthorized the bulk-collection program, subject to a series of more 
detailed conditions on the information’s collection and use.135  
From September 2009 until the President ordered modifications to the program in 
the wake of Edward Snowden’s information leak,136 the orders reauthorizing bulk 
collection of telephony metadata also incorporated the lessons the court had learned. 
As a result, the program was subject to a spectrum of controls and oversight 
requirements. Many of the procedures were simply designed to ensure compliance 
with the applicable rules. So the NSA was instructed to maintain procedures to 
control access to and use of the metadata, to provide adequate briefings and training 
to personnel authorized to receive query results, and to implement software controls 
both to limit and to track all access to the metadata.137  
Finally, the court enlisted other government agencies to assist in its gatekeeping 
role in the section 215 program. For example, the NSA was required to provide the 
National Security Division with copies of its procedures, briefing, and training 
materials;138 to consult with the National Security Division about any legal opinions 
about the interpretation, scope, and/or implementation of this authority;139 and to 
meet with the National Security Division and any other appropriate NSA officials to 
assess compliance, submitting in writing to the court the results of that meeting.140 
The NSA Office of the Inspector General was required to have a similar meeting 
with the National Security Division to discuss oversight and assess compliance.141 
Prior to 2011 when the bulk collection of pen/trap information was discontinued, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 132. Id. at 15 n.17 (discussing Judge Walton’s order). 
 133. March 2, 2009, Order, supra note 100, at 18.  
 134. Id. at 18–19  
 135. See Sept. 3, 2009, Primary Order, supra note 127, at 2–3, 5–18.  
 136. See Remarks on United States Signals Intelligence, supra note 35, at 6–7 (limiting use 
of metadata collected under section 215 and calling for the development of an approach that 
can achieve the program’s goals without the government holding this metadata itself). 
 137. Sept. 3, 2009, Primary Order, supra note 127, at 11–12. 
 138. Sept. 3, 2009, Primary Order, supra note 127, at 11, 17.  
 139. Id. at 16. 
 140. Id. at 17. 
 141. Id. 
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orders reauthorizing that program contained similarly detailed and extensive 
oversight mechanisms. None of this is to say that the protections were sufficient or 
that the program should have been continued. It is merely to say that the FISA 
Court’s performance in this regard has been much more than a rubber stamp for the 
government. 
One might argue that, rather than demonstrating the FISA Court’s virtues as a 
gatekeeper, the forgoing instead shows that despite all of the FISA Court’s oversight 
efforts, the government continued to violate its orders, to engage in overcollection, 
and to access and improperly disseminate metadata information. Moreover, one 
might opine that the FISA judges should have more severely restricted surveillance 
programs when government noncompliance came to its attention.  
To be sure, the FISA Court did not prevent all problems; as gatekeeper it can only 
do so much. At the same time, it is clear that no matter the outcome, the FISA Court 
took seriously its responsibility to engage in oversight, took action to press the 
government to comply with its orders, and served as a partner in devising means of 
permitting the government to continue its surveillance activities without abdicating 
all limits and controls. In addition, through its demands for information, spot checks, 
and other methods, the FISA Court ended noncompliance that might otherwise have 
continued unchecked, prompted examinations of the system that revealed to 
additional flaws, and led to the implementation of measures that should lead to better 
compliance going forward.  
B. Weak Rule-Maker Analysis  
Given the secret, nonadversarial nature of the pre-USA FREEDOM Act FISA 
Court’s operations, it should perhaps come as no surprise that FISA judges have been 
insufficiently rigorous in their rule making about bulk-collection programs. While 
the FISA Court does have its defenders, the verdict of independent committees, 
government agencies, federal courts, and legal commentators is nearly unanimous in 
finding FISA Court “rule making” opinions regarding bulk collection wanting.142 
Indeed, even those who endorse the opinions’ conclusions refrain from defending 
their reasoning.143 The opinions sometimes fail to grapple with the difficult legal 
questions that are presented and sometimes seem to adopt uncritically the 
government’s arguments, even when those arguments call for serious analysis. These 
flaws are on display in the initial opinions authorizing the bulk collection of 
information through the FISA pen/trap and business records provisions respectively.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 815–19 (2d. Cir. 2015) (holding that the 
section 215 program was not authorized by the statutory language); Klayman v. Obama, 957 
F. Supp. 2d. 1, 29–42 (D.D.C. 2013 (arguing that the section 215 program was likely 
unconstitutional), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015); PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, 
supra note 34, at 57–136 (describing in detail multiple arguments that the FISA court’s 
analysis was flawed); PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 203–04; Donohue, 
supra note 76, at 822–24 (lamenting the precedential value assigned to FISA Court opinions). 
 143. E.g., PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 208–18 (dissenting views by 
members of the PCLOB); Margulies, supra note 59, at 52–53.  
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1. Authorizing Bulk Collection of Internet Metadata  
As discussed in Part I.A.2, Judge Kollar-Kotelly wrote the opinion in 2004 
approving for the first time the collection of domestic Internet-communications 
metadata under the statutory provision authorizing the use of pen/traps.144 And while 
she was a strong gatekeeper—insisting on a role in evaluating the government’s 
submissions, demanding additional information about First Amendment 
implications, and imposing restrictions on the use of the collected data145—her 
rule-making performance was less impressive. Indeed, her opinion sidesteps the truly 
thorny questions that the bulk-collection application presents. 
The opinion notes at the very outset that the government’s application sought “a 
much broader type of collection than other pen register/trap and trace 
applications.”146 The FISA pen/trap provision in effect at the time required the FISA 
Court to approve a pen/trap application whenever the Attorney General certified 
“that the information likely to be obtained . . . is relevant to an ongoing investigation 
to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”147 Its 
plain text indicates that the pen/trap statute envisioned collection of metadata 
information from individual targets. One clue to the statute’s intended use came in 
the provision indicating what must be included in a FISA judge-issued pen/trap 
order:  
An order issued under this section . . . shall specify . . . the identity . . . 
of the person who is the subject of the investigation[,] the identity . . . of 
the person . . . in whose name is listed the [targeted facility] . . . [and] the 
attributes of the communications to which the order applies.148 
Yet the government sought authorization to utilize this provision not to collect 
noncontent information about a particular subscriber’s communications but instead 
to engage in bulk collection of “specified [classified] categories of metadata about 
Internet communications.”149 In other words, rather than collecting the e-mail 
addresses with which Suspect X corresponded, the government sought to collect an 
entire category of noncontent data—for example, all noncontent data about e-mail 
traffic into and out of the United States.150 
Judge Kollar-Kotelly displayed obvious misgivings regarding the application of 
the statutory provision urged by the government. Recall that the statute provided that 
when the Attorney General makes the required certification that use of a pen/trap is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. For a definition of metadata, see supra note 2. 
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 100–01. 
 146. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 1–2. 
 147. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (Supp. 2003). This provision was modified by the USA 
FREEDOM Act of 2015. Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codified in scattered sections of 
the U.S.C.). 
 148. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2) (Supp. 2003) (modified by the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015). 
 149. Bates Memorandum Opinion, supra note 97, at 2. The list of what categories were 
approved for collection is not available publicly, but at the very least they include IP addresses 
and e-mail addresses. 
 150. The actual categories of data that the government collected remain classified. 
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likely to yield information “relevant to an ongoing investigation,”151 “the judge shall 
enter an ex parte order.”152 That is to say, the statute seems to insist that once the 
government certifies that the relevance standard is met, the FISA judge (so long as 
all other requirements are also met) has no discretion with respect to whether to issue 
an order.153 But the opinion rejects the seemingly self-evident conclusion that the 
statute eliminates an independent role for the court in evaluating the sufficiency of 
the government’s certification. Clearly uncomfortable with giving such broad 
collection authority to the government without judicial oversight, Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly insists that the Court is permitted to look behind the government’s 
certification to “resolv[e] doubts about the correctness of the certification.”154  
Perhaps more revealing of Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s concerns are the procedural 
limitations she imposed on the program. Unlike section 215, the pen/trap provision 
at the time did not require minimization procedures.155 Yet Judge Kollar-Kotelly 
imposed them nonetheless, placing restrictions on storage, access, and dissemination 
of the collected metadata. The specific restrictions were nearly identical to the 
minimization procedures statutorily imposed on the section 215 bulk-collection 
program.156  
Imposing these minimization procedures demonstrates that Judge Kollar-Kotelly 
saw the pen/trap bulk collection as severely intrusive into individual privacy rights. 
Minimization procedures developed in response to concerns that collection, use, or 
dissemination of some Fourth Amendment-protected material would be 
unconstitutionally intrusive without such measures. For example, courts considering 
the constitutionality of FISA content-collection provisions have relied, at least in 
part, on minimization procedures to conclude that the collection is “reasonable” and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (Supp. 2003).   
 152. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1) (2000). Arguably, the very fact that the statute confers such 
little control over the power on judges is evidence of Congress’s intent to authorize collection 
that was narrow in scope. See Orin Kerr, Problems with the FISC’s Newly-Declassified 
Opinion on Bulk Collection of Internet Metadata, LAWFARE (Nov. 19, 2013, 2:35 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/problems-fiscs-newly-declassified-opinion-bulk-collection
-internet-metadata [https://perma.cc/XZ7F-PB72]. 
 153. Cf. In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Installation 
and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 846 F. Supp. 1555, 1561–62 (M.D. Fla. 
1994) (interpreting the domestic criminal pen/trap statute to foreclose additional judicial 
inquiry once the government’s application has met the statutory requirements). But see Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 27 n.19. 
 154. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 27 n.19. 
 155. The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 added a minimization requirement to the pen/trap 
provision. Pub. L. No. 114-23, sec. 202, § 402, 129 Stat. 268, 277–78 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1842). 
 156. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 82–87 (requiring in part 
that the information remain segregated, that limited numbers of people have access to the 
information, that the relevant database be queried only using seeds meeting the RAS standard, 
that any queries be auditable, that the NSA’s General Counsel monitor the program, and that 
any dissemination comply with existing rules about minimizing U.S. person information). 
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therefore consistent with the Fourth Amendment.157 In other words, absent the use of 
minimization procedures to mitigate the privacy impact of collecting Fourth 
Amendment-protected “papers and effects,” FISA content collection might 
impermissibly intrude on Fourth Amendment rights.  
If, however, noncontent data such as the information collected pursuant to the 
pen/trap statute is not protected by the Fourth Amendment—as the government 
maintains and Judge Kollar-Kotelly accepts—the “reasonableness” requirement is 
simply inapplicable.158 There is no constitutional reason to minimize the information 
gathered from such collection. Of course Congress can add statutory privacy 
protections that exceed the Fourth Amendment floor. The minimization procedures 
imposed on section 215 represent one such regulation. But these limits derive from 
a congressional determination that constitutional protections are insufficient. 
Congress could have imposed minimization procedures on pen/trap collection as a 
means of limiting its privacy impact despite the inapplicability of the Fourth 
Amendment just as it did for section 215 collection. But it did not. If Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly found the government’s intended use of the pen/trap provision in need 
of protections often employed for Fourth Amendment-protected information, 
perhaps she should have concluded that the government’s interpretation of what the 
statute permits is broader than Congress intended. 
Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s analysis of whether the government’s application met the 
statute’s requirement that the information collected be “relevant” to an ongoing 
investigation also displays her qualms that the pen/trap provision, as interpreted by 
the government, was excessively broad. Accepting that “only a very small percentage 
of the information obtained will be . . . directly relevant,” Judge Kollar-Kotelly found 
the bulk collection to be relevant nonetheless because “the collection of both a huge 
volume and high percentage of unrelated communications [is] necessary to identify 
the much smaller number” of terrorism-related communications.159 Consequently, 
she concluded, the applicable relevance standard did not require a statistical “‘tight 
fit’ between the volume of proposed collection and the much smaller proportion of 
information that will be directly relevant to [redacted] FBI investigations.”160 In other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. E.g., In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1013 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008); United States v. 
Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
 158. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to the list of phone numbers one dials). The third-party doctrine 
that the Supreme Court created in a series of opinions in the 1970s, including Smith, see infra 
notes 184–93 and accompanying text, provides that information voluntarily revealed to a 
“third party,” a term encompassing any individual or non-government institution, enjoys no 
Fourth Amendment protection.  See generally Smith, 442 U.S. 735; United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435 (1976). The doctrine arguably applies not only to communications metadata but 
also banking and medical records, Amazon shopping history, etc.  And while the doctrine has 
been subject to significant criticism, from both courts and commentators, see, e.g., United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954–57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Orin S. Kerr, The 
Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 n.5 (2009) (listing some of the 
critiques of the doctrine), it is clear that Judge Kollar-Kotelly accepted its applicability to the 
pen/trap metadata. 
 159. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 48–49. 
 160. Id. at 49–50. 
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words, even though the vast majority of the information collected under the pen/trap 
program will not actually be relevant to a terrorism investigation, the government 
can only find the information that is relevant if it collects large volumes of 
information. Therefore, the entire database is relevant. 
To support this conclusion, Judge Kollar-Kotelly indicates that she “finds 
instructive Supreme Court precedents on when a search that is not predicated on 
individualized suspicion may nonetheless be reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.”161 Those precedents establish a balancing test for evaluating 
“reasonableness,” in which courts must weigh the privacy expectations of the 
individual and the intrusiveness of the search against the government’s interest.162 
Despite noting that she does not consider the pen/trap metadata subject to Fourth 
Amendment protections, Judge Kollar-Kotelly goes on to employ this balancing test 
as part of her inquiry into whether the metadata is relevant to an ongoing 
investigation. She determines that the privacy interest is minimal given the absence 
of Fourth Amendment protection, and the government interest in thwarting terrorist 
attacks is compelling. And because the proposed bulk collection is analogous to 
suspicionless searches that have been upheld under the Fourth Amendment, the 
determination that the information is relevant is appropriate, despite the fact that only 
a very small proportion of the huge volume of information will actually be directly 
relevant.163 
In other words, despite the inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment to the data 
collected, Judge Kollar-Kotelly determines that the information collected under the 
pen/trap bulk-collection program is “relevant” to a qualified investigation because it 
satisfies the balancing test that would apply to information protected under the Fourth 
Amendment.164 But this is a non sequitur. The statutory meaning of the word 
“relevance” is not contingent on whether a program would be considered 
constitutional if the Fourth Amendment applied. The question is whether Congress 
has authorized this use of the pen/trap statute. The opinion never explains what 
applicability a Fourth Amendment balancing test has on whether the information in 
question satisfies the “relevant” requirement. 
If the government’s desired use of an authority seems inconsistent with the level 
of judicial oversight contemplated by the statute, a reasonable judge might conclude 
the statute does not actually permit that use, rather than concluding that the statute 
does not mean what it says. But Judge Kollar-Kotelly reached the opposite 
conclusion, approving the government’s use of the pen/trap statute, but only after 
asserting a more aggressive judicial oversight role and imposing minimization-like 
procedures on the resulting information.165 
                                                                                                                 
 
 161. Id. at 50. 
 162. Id. at 50–52. 
 163. Id. at 54. 
 164. Id. 
 165. During the seven years that the pen/trap bulk-collection program continued, there is 
no indication that any FISA judge analyzed independently this interpretation of the pen/trap 
provision. In the wake of compliance problems, Judge John Bates imposed additional 
oversight mechanisms—beefed up the gatekeeping—but did not revisit the substantive 
analysis. Bates Memorandum Opinion, supra note 97, at 82–97. 
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2. Authorizing Bulk Collection of Telephony Metadata  
The FISA Court’s approval of the telephony metadata collection under the 
pre-USA FREEDOM Act version of section 215 also displays questionable legal 
analysis and has been roundly criticized. In fact, a majority of the members of the 
PCLOB determined that, contrary to the FISA Court’s conclusion, “there are 
multiple and cumulative reasons for concluding that Section 215 does not authorize 
the NSA’s ongoing daily collection of telephone calling records concerning virtually 
every American.”166 This Part does not purport to provide an exhaustive list of the 
grounds on which the FISA Court’s approval may be (and has been) assailed.167 It 
will, however, briefly note some of the most problematic aspects of the FISA Court’s 
analysis and devote some attention to a few less well-trodden arguments.  
First and foremost, it seems that no FISA judge undertook the project of actually 
putting to paper the legal justification for the program until after news of it had leaked 
to the public. From 2006 to 2013, the FISA Court permitted the NSA to collect all 
telephony metadata without (apparently) bothering to draft a reasoned opinion 
explaining why the program was within the government’s statutory authority. The 
government, to be sure, did submit a lengthy brief to the court setting out its own 
arguments for the lawfulness of the program.168 But the order approving the 
application was issued the day after the government’s brief was filed with the 
court.169 This did not give the FISA judge a great deal of time to reach a considered 
decision. Of course, given that FISA Court applications are often the culmination of 
a series of communications between the Justice Department and the judge, the judge 
likely knew of the government’s arguments before they were officially filed.170 And 
one must assume that the FISA Court was convinced by those arguments. 
Nevertheless, while the initial approval of the pen/trap bulk Internet data collection 
program called for an eighty-seven-page memorandum opinion,171 the interpretation 
of a different statutory provision to permit equally expansive collection of phone 
records merely produced an order stating that the government’s application satisfied 
section 215’s statutory requirements and setting out some (statutorily required) 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166. PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 57. Two of the PCLOB’s five 
members disagreed, arguing that, given the complexity of the legal questions presented, the 
FISA Court’s interpretation could not definitively be labeled incorrect; it does not assert that 
the FISA Court’s is the best interpretation of the statute. Id. at 210, 215. 
 167. In addition to the arguments laid out here, see also ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 
(2d Cir. 2015) (rejecting the government’s assertion that the entirety of domestic telephony 
metadata was “relevant” to an investigation, as required by the statute); PCLOB SECTION 215 
REPORT, supra note 34, at 57–102 (detailing why the Board concluded that the program was 
neither authorized by statute nor consistent with the Constitution); Donohue, supra note 76, at 
836–62 (same). 
 168. Memorandum of Law in Support of Application for Certain Tangible Things for 
Investigations to Protect Against International Terrorism, No. BR 06-05 (FISA Ct. May 23, 
2006) [hereinafter May 23, 2006, Memorandum of Law]. 
 169. Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring 
the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 06-05 (FISA Ct. May 24, 
2006) [hereinafter May 24, 2006, Order].  
 170. Letter from Hon. Reggie B. Walton, supra note 20, at 2–3. 
 171. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54. 
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minimization procedures governing the NSA’s storage and use of the resulting 
data.172  
The FISA Court did not decline to prepare a written opinion at the inception of 
the section 215 bulk collection program because the question was an insignificant 
one. Indeed, the government’s application recognized the importance of its request, 
providing the court with a detailed argument for the legality of using section 215 for 
bulk collection. That the PCLOB as well as at least one federal judge and one federal 
appeals court have determined that the program was not consistent with either the 
Constitution or the language of section 215 (or both) illustrates that at the very least 
the application presented the court with difficult legal questions on which reasonable 
minds might disagree.173 Such questions merit a thorough, reasoned judicial analysis.  
Once Snowden revealed the existence of the section 215 program, the FISA Court 
did issue an opinion. That opinion, however, came out of a government application 
that differed from its 2006 counterpart in two interesting ways. First, in July 2013, 
just over a month after Snowden’s initial revelations, the government notified Judge 
Eagan during an ex parte hearing regarding the July 2013 reauthorization application 
that it was working on “an updated legal analysis . . . with regard to the application 
of Section 215 to bulk telephony metadata collection.”174 A description of that 
updated analysis was released publicly in Administration Section 215 White Paper 
on August 9, 2013.175 In it, the government’s argument that the entirety of the 
metadata is “relevant” to an ongoing investigation is significantly altered from its 
2006 counterpart. The 2006 version of its argument, consisting of a few paragraphs, 
largely relied on the claim that, in determining whether bulk metadata meets the 
relevance standard, “for reasons of both constitutional authority and practical 
competence,” the court should defer “to the fully considered judgment of the 
executive branch in . . . determining the potential significance of intelligence-related 
information.”176 Second, nearly four of the original brief’s twenty-seven pages are 
devoted to a section labeled “The Al Qaeda Threat,” reminding the court of the events 
of 9/11 and al-Qaeda’s continuing desire to strike at America.177 Clearly the 
government relied on the urgency of the threat to help convince a judge to defer to 
the government’s legal interpretation. 
The 2013 Administration Section 215 White Paper provides a stark contrast on 
both of these points. First, the government never mentions al-Qaeda or any other 
terrorist group. Rather than raising the emotional specter of 9/11, it is devoted 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. May 24, 2006, Order, supra note 170.  
 173. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2015); PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34. 
 174. Amended Memorandum Opinion at 3 n.4, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], 
No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Aug. 29, 2013, Amended Memorandum 
Opinion]. 
 175. ADMINISTRATION SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 33. The white paper was 
released after the government completed its submission to the court, and Judge Eagan did not 
rely on it. Aug. 29, 2013, Amended Memorandum Opinion, supra note 175, at 3 n.4. 
 176. May 23, 2006, Memorandum of Law, supra note 169, at 16–17 (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 177. Id. at 4–7. 
2016] THE TWO FACES OF THE FISA COURT 1223 
 
entirely to legal analysis. Second, it offers an elaborate defense of treating metadata 
as relevant. This defense includes a meticulous effort to analogize the collection of 
an entire database of phone records to the type of information collection that goes on 
during civil or criminal discovery, reassurance that the government’s definition of 
relevance does have limits, and an argument that its relevance analysis satisfies not 
only section 215’s requirements but the Constitution’s as well.178 Clearly the 
government felt that its existing legal analysis supporting the section 215 bulk 
collection program—the legal analysis the FISA Court accepted in 2006 and under 
which the program operated for seven years—was insufficient to withstand public 
scrutiny. So once the seven-year-old program was made public, the government 
hurried to provide legal analysis. Did the original order accept these relatively weak 
analyses (in part) because of the severity of the threat? It is impossible to know. But 
when the Court in 2013 approved the program just as it had for each of the previous 
government applications, it did so with the benefit of a much more thorough, less 
emotional, application. 
Nevertheless, even this newly minted defense of the program has been roundly 
criticized. Perhaps the most widely condemned aspect of the 2013 opinion is its 
interpretation of section 215’s “relevance” requirement—a requirement that mimics 
the language from the pen/trap provision limiting collection to information relevant to 
an ongoing applicable investigation. In its May 2006 application, the government relied 
upon what it referred to as the “ground breaking and innovative” decision Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly had written for the pen/trap program.179 The FISA Court did not revisit 
the propriety of Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s treatment of the relevance requirement, nor did 
it discuss whether or how that interpretation of “relevance”— from the entirely distinct 
context of the pen/trap application—should be affected by the differences between 
the telephony metadata collection program, which was governed by section 215, and 
the Internet metadata collection program implemented pursuant to the pen/trap 
provision, which was the subject of Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s original “relevance” 
analysis.180 Any thoroughly reasoned discussion of the lawfulness of the bulk 
collection of telephony data would have to confront this question. If the court did so, 
it failed to memorialize why it found the analogy to the pen/trap program sufficiently 
apt. Moreover, as the PCLOB points out, the FISA Court’s interpretation means that 
“if the government develops an effective means of searching through everything in 
order to find something, then everything becomes relevant to its investigations. 
The word ‘relevant’ becomes limited only by the government’s technological 
                                                                                                                 
 
 178. ADMINISTRATION SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 33, at 10–15. 
 179. May 23, 2006, Memorandum of Law, supra note 169, at 3.  In the publicly available 
version of this memorandum, identifying information about the “ground breaking and 
innovative” decision the government relies on is redacted.  As the memorandum quotes from 
Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s 2004 opinion, however, it is clearly referring to that opinion.  
 180. PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 44 (explaining that under the Internet 
program, records were acquired if they travelled through designated communications channels 
likely to contain messages of counterterrorism interest; the section 215 program collected all 
telephony metadata). As the FISA Court has recognized, “nearly all of the call detail records 
collected pertain to communications of non-U.S. persons [and] U.S. persons who are not the 
subject of an applicable FBI investigation.” March 2, 2009, Order, supra note 100, at 12 
(emphasis in original).  
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capacity to ingest information and sift through it efficiently.”181 Not even the 
government argued that section 215 permits such expansive collection. Yet the FISA 
Court did not explain why telephony metadata differs from other information in such 
a way that its opinion would not apply with equal force to other types of information. 
Like the PCLOB, other analyses of the section 215 program have determined that the 
government’s definition of relevance was far broader than Congress intended.182  
There are also several questions a thorough opinion would have addressed that do 
not appear at all in the 2013 opinion. One is the question whether the government’s 
position that metadata is not protected by the Fourth Amendment remains valid. That 
position rests on the applicability of the third-party record doctrine, established in a 
series of cases in the 1970s, including Smith v. Maryland, to telephony metadata.183 
In Smith, the government had used a pen register to collect the list of phone numbers 
dialed from a criminal suspect’s home phone.  When the government sought to enter 
that information into evidence at trial, the suspect moved to have it suppressed on 
the grounds that it was collected without a warrant in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not protect 
the information because it was information that a telephone subscriber knowingly 
surrendered to the telephone company, and the subscriber therefore had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in it.184 It is this doctrine upon which Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly relied in determining that Internet metadata did not enjoy Fourth 
Amendment protection in 2004,185 and Judge Eagan in turn relies in part on Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly’s opinion in reaching the conclusion that the same held true in the 
section 215 context in 2013.186 
But in relying on Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s analysis, Judge Eagan’s section 215 
opinion never seriously considers whether the Smith v. Maryland argument continues 
to apply with the same force to telephony metadata collected in bulk in 2013 as it did 
in 2004. As an initial matter, regardless of the year, several courts and commentators 
have noted that the privacy interest in an individual’s telephony metadata and the 
privacy interest in the same information gathered in bulk might be very different.  
This argument had even more force in 2013 than it did in 2004, given both the 
technological advances that have taken place in storing and analyzing bulk data and 
the argument Justice Sotomayor made in her concurrence in United States v. Jones 
in 2012.187 The Jones Court held that, by placing a GPS device on a criminal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 181. PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 62 (emphasis in original); id. (similar 
databases could be compiled with e-mails, bank accounts, debit and credit card use, money 
orders, vehicle rentals, hotel records, property leases, library borrowing, and websites visited). 
“This elastic definition of relevance not only proves too much,” the PCLOB argues, “but also 
supplies a license for nearly unlimited governmental acquisition of other kinds of transactional 
information collection.” Id. 
 182. Compare id. at 60–81 with ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 812 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 183. ADMINISTRATION SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 33, at 19–20. 
 184. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979). 
 185. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 58–63. 
 186. Aug. 29, 2013, Amended Memorandum Opinion, supra note 175, at 8–9. 
 187. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More 
fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”). 
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suspect’s car to record his location information twenty-four hours a day for several 
weeks without a warrant, the government trespassed on private property in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.188 Concurring in the result, Justice Sotomayor argued that 
the Court should take a closer look at the Fourth Amendment implications of bulk 
data collection.189 In fact, she went so far as to suggest that the Court might need to 
rethink the scope of the third-party doctrine in light of modern technological tools, 
calling the continued applicability of that doctrine into question, at least in the context 
of bulk collection.190 As Sotomayor points out, the government’s contemporary 
data-storage and search capacity means that aggregating data in bulk permits the 
government to infer significant and intimate information about an individual’s 
lifestyle—religious habits, social circle, medical condition, and more—that it could 
not infer from one individual’s phone records alone.191 Yet Judge Eagan simply 
asserts conclusively that “where one individual does not have a Fourth Amendment 
interest, grouping together a large number of similarly situated individuals cannot 
result in a Fourth Amendment interest springing into existence ex nihilo.”192 
Nowhere in her opinion does she mention United States v. Jones, nor does she try to 
explain why the courts and commentators who take a contrary position regarding the 
ways in which bulk data changes the privacy interests at play are incorrect. Judge 
Eagan is certainly entitled to conclude that the telephony metadata is not protected 
by the Fourth Amendment because of Smith v. Maryland and its progeny. But doing 
so in a convincing fashion requires acknowledgement of the contrary argument and 
a reasoned analysis of why that argument is wrong. The 2013 opinion includes 
neither of these. 
There are several other omissions that the PCLOB discusses,193 including one that 
demonstrates nicely the challenge of effective rule making for the court. An issue 
that the FISA Court left unaddressed—for at least two years—was the question of 
how the limits on sharing metadata covered by the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA) might impact the legal analysis of section 215.194 One provision 
                                                                                                                 
 
 188.  Id. at 948 (describing facts); id. at 950 (discussing the trespass). 
 189. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 190. Id. 
 191. See id.; Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 
2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13-cv-03994) (describing how metadata can reveal a great deal 
of intimate information about an individual). 
 192. Aug. 29, 2013, Amended Memorandum Opinion, supra note 175, at 9 (italics in 
original).  
 193. PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 57–102 (arguing that the FISA Court 
did not consider whether the government’s interpretation of section 215 ran afoul of its 
requirement for the information sought to be relevant to an (as opposed to many) investigation, 
whether section 215 permits the FISA Court to issue prospective orders for information that 
does not exist at the time of the order, or whether it was permissible for the NSA to collect, 
store, and analyze the telephony metadata when section 215 authorizes the records be “made 
available to” or “received by” the FBI (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 194. See Supplemental Opinion at 1, In re Production of Tangible Things from 
[REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Dec. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Dec. 12, 2008, 
Supplemental Opinion].  ECPA amended an existing statute so that wire taps on telephone 
calls also applied to electronic data transmitted by computer.  Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. I, 100 
Stat. 1848, 1848–59 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2510).  The Stored Communications Act 
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of ECPA specifies an ostensibly exhaustive list of means by which the government 
may compel a service provider to produce noncontent records.195 Section 215 orders 
do not appear on that list. The court’s conclusion that the program did not violate 
ECPA’s limitations on disclosure of customer records may or may not be the right 
one. What is more important is that the FISA Court failed even to consider the 
question—and therefore whether the service providers and the government were 
systematically violating ECPA—for years.196 These unaddressed arguments are the 
type of thing that one can imagine being raised by opposing counsel in public, 
adversarial proceedings. 
The government argues that, regardless of how the FISA Court might answer a 
particular question given a blank slate, the court should defer to the government’s 
interpretation of FISA. This might be either because the Justice Department’s or the 
NSA’s interpretation of the statute is entitled to some form of deference often 
extended to agency interpretations of statutory provisions, or because courts 
generally should defer to the executive on matters of foreign affairs and national 
security because of its superior information and expertise. And FISA judges have at 
times accepted this argument.197 On this view, the preceding critiques are invalid 
because the FISA Court is correct in adopting the government’s interpretation of the 
law so long as it is within the bounds of reason.  
But the traditional arguments for deference are not triggered in the bulk-collection 
context.198 First, consider the administrative law doctrine of Chevron deference.199 
Under Chevron, judges must accept executive branch agencies’ interpretations of 
ambiguous statutes they are tasked with administering so long as that interpretation 
is reasonable.200 There are two barriers to affording Chevron-like deference to the 
interpretation of section 215. As an initial matter, it is not clear that Congress has 
delegated interpretive power to either the Justice Department or the NSA in the way 
that many executive agencies are tasked with administering statutes.201 If any entity 
has been entrusted with a special role in interpreting FISA, it is the FISA Court itself. 
                                                                                                                 
 
added prohibitions on access to stored electronic communications to ECPA.  Pub. L. No. 
99-508, tit. II, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860–68 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–10). 
 195. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (2012). 
 196. See PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 34, at 91–95. 
 197. Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s Pen/Trap Opinion, supra note 54, at 30–31 (“The Court also 
recognizes that, for reasons of both constitutional authority and practical competence, 
deference should be given to the fully considered judgment of the executive branch in 
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 198. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 
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in order to respond to complex and changing world conditions,” “decisions in this area tend to 
be more political than legal in nature,” and “the executive branch has much greater expertise 
and access to information than the courts concerning foreign affairs matters”). 
 199. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 200. Id. at 843. 
 201. See Bradley, supra note 199, at 670–71 (“As the Court suggested in Chevron and 
made clearer in subsequent decisions, ‘[a] precondition to deference under Chevron is a 
congressional delegation of administrative authority.’” (italics in original) (quoting Adams 
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990))). 
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The executive branch is therefore not entitled to deference beyond the persuasiveness 
of its arguments. Moreover, many critics of the section 215 opinion—and the same 
would hold true for the pen/trap opinion as well—do not consider section 215 an 
ambiguous statute. On this view, the plain language of the statute clearly precludes 
the executive branch’s interpretation of the law.202 Chevron does not compel 
deference to executive interpretations of unambiguous statutes.  
The argument for foreign affairs deference is similarly thin. To the extent that the 
executive’s experience, expertise, and information advantages justify judicial 
deference on matters of foreign policy and national security, those considerations are 
not implicated here. The question is a purely legal one concerning the meaning of 
legislation. This is an area where, if any branch is entitled to deference due to its 
expertise, it is the judiciary. In addition, this is not an area where the executive is 
acting in the absence of congressional guidance on the issue. Rather, Congress has 
explicitly interposed the judiciary between the executive and FISA surveillance for 
the purpose of ensuring independent oversight of executive branch intelligence 
collection. Thus, unless the executive branch possesses exclusive, unilateral 
authority over intelligence collection—a position that not even the government takes 
with respect to section 215—it is proper for FISA judges to engage in independent 
judicial interpretations of FISA.203  
In sum, when the FISA Court considers bulk-collection applications, it seems not 
to push back very hard against the government’s arguments.204 The court has simply 
lacked the necessary tools to fulfill its newly minted rule-making role. As a result, 
rather than serving as an independent check on the executive’s efforts, the court has 
served as an enabler. The next Part considers whether there are ways to remedy this 
state of affairs. 
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Wiretap Moves Before Congress’s Approval, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015) 
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III. REFORM 
In this Part, I consider ideas for FISA Court reform, including those enacted in 
the USA FREEDOM Act, in light of the FISA Court’s performance as gatekeeper 
and as rule maker. Part III.A addresses reforms targeting the court’s gatekeeping 
functions and argues that the court’s strong showing as a gatekeeper renders efforts 
designed to address the “rubber stamp” accusation—such as proposals to modify the 
process by which judges are named to the FISA Court—unnecessary. At the same 
time, the court’s effectiveness as gatekeeper could be amplified by implementing 
reform in an area that has thus far received insufficient attention: ensuring that FISA 
judges have accurate information about the government surveillance activity they are 
overseeing. Part III.B then goes on to address reforms aimed at the area most in need 
of attention—the court’s rule-making performance—such as increasing the 
adversarial nature and transparency of the FISA Court’s operations. It concludes that 
the legislative choices reflected in the USA FREEDOM Act fail to recognize just 
how inadequate FISA’s procedures proved to be for a court expected to engage in 
rule making. As a result, the Act’s reforms gesture in the right direction but fall far 
short of actually addressing the problem. 
A. Reforms of the FISA Court’s Gatekeeping Role 
This Part first explains why the FISA Court’s gatekeeping performance 
demonstrates that modifications to the makeup of the court are unnecessary and then 
considers the fact that, no matter how seriously the FISA judges take their oversight 
responsibilities, they can only be effective if they have the necessary information 
about the surveillance activities they have authorized. As neither the USA 
FREEDOM Act nor other proposals that have been floated go far enough in shoring 
up this aspect of FISA Court operations, I advance some suggestions with respect to 
how to do so.  
1. Judicial Selection 
The USA FREEDOM Act did well not to heed calls for modifying the makeup 
of the court and the means by which FISA judges are selected. Legislators, 
commentators, and even the President’s Review Group have advocated several 
different ways to alter how FISA judges are chosen to serve on the court. At the 
heart of each of these proposals is an effort to redistribute the power over judicial 
selection. One proposal would include judges from each judicial circuit and require 
FISA Court of Review appointments to be approved by five Supreme Court 
justices.205 Another would require FISA judges to be selected by the same process 
as Article III judges—appointment by the President with the advice and consent of 
the Senate.206 Yet another would have FISA judges chosen as follows: three by the 
Chief Justice, two by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, two by the Senate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 205. FISA Judicial Selection Reform Act of 2013, S. 1460, 113th Cong. (2013). The 
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Majority Leader, and two each by the House and Senate Minority Leaders.207 Finally, 
the President’s Review Group suggested that rather than lodging the appointment 
power in the Chief Justice alone, each member of the Supreme Court should have 
the authority to select one or two members of the court from within the circuit(s) over 
which they have jurisdiction.208  
These proposals represent a solution in search of a problem. Most advocates for 
adjusting the court’s selection process are motivated by the concern that the currently 
serving judges operate as rubber stamps. The accusation is that, because of their 
professional backgrounds or their political affiliations, FISA judges as currently 
selected are inclined to approve government surveillance applications without 
assessing them critically. To prove this allegation, critics point to the court’s 
overwhelming rate of approval for government applications.209  
High rates of approval, however, do not necessarily reflect a FISA Court bench 
partial to the government. First of all, the Justice Department lawyers responsible for 
preparing FISA applications know the standards that must be met and value 
maintaining their credibility before the court.210 That the vast majority of applications 
are approved may be less about the judges’ willingness to question the government 
than it is about government attorneys ensuring that their applications meet the 
necessary requirements. Second, FISA Court supporters note that the ninety-nine 
percent approval figure does “‘not reflect the fact that many applications are altered 
prior to final submission or even withheld from final submission entirely, often after 
an indication that a judge would not approve them.’”211 And finally, former FISA 
Judge James Carr attributes the government’s success rate not to “spinelessness or 
excessive deference to the government” but instead to the forgiving standards that 
the government must meet.212 Thus, the government’s success rate may be more 
about the substance of surveillance law’s requirements (or lack thereof) than it is 
about the FISA Court’s application of that law.  
Moreover, we have seen concrete examples of FISA judges operating with 
initiative and independence. We know that the FISA Court refused to authorize some 
section 215 applications “based on concerns that the investigation was premised on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 207. FISA Court Accountability Act, H.R. 2586, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 208. PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 43, at 201, 208. 
 209. See supra Part I.B. 
 210. See Letter from Attorney Gen. Michael B. Mukasey to NYPD Comm’r Raymond W. 
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protected First Amendment activity.”213 And recall Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s treatment 
of the pen/trap provision that specified that “‘the judge shall enter’” a surveillance 
order if the application includes each element listed in the statute, including a 
certification that the surveillance will likely obtain “‘foreign intelligence information 
. . . or is relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international 
terrorism.’”214 This statutory language plainly sought to limit judicial oversight of 
such applications to ensuring that the application included the relevant certification; 
it authorized no judicial assessment of the accuracy or validity of the statements 
contained in the certification. Yet in the face of this language, Judge Kollar-Kotelly 
insisted that FISA judges retained the power to look behind the assertions on 
government applications and evaluate not only whether they included all the required 
elements but also that those elements were accurate representations.215 These are not 
the acts of a rubber stamp. 
The other justification for modifying the FISA judge selection process is the 
President’s Review Group’s concerns about the lack of diversity among FISA judges. 
This proposal seems to assume that a more diverse slate of judges would include 
members more likely to push back against government applications. But while in the 
abstract greater diversity of judges—whether based on geography, ideology, or 
professional background—is a good thing, FISA judges have exhibited similar 
strengths and weaknesses. Whether appointed to the bench by Republican or 
Democratic presidents, they have excelled at gatekeeping (when they have adequate 
information) and have failed at rule making. Changing the makeup of the court itself, 
or how judges are selected to serve on it, will not address the FISA Court’s true 
weaknesses; the USA FREEDOM Act’s omission of provisions along these lines is 
thus entirely appropriate.  
2. Ensuring the FISA Court is Fully Informed  
Guaranteeing that the FISA Court has all of the information it needs to be an 
effective gatekeeper is one area of reform that has received insufficient attention. The 
court potentially suffers from lack of two types of information—information about 
how the executive branch is implementing the court’s orders, and expertise in the 
highly technical aspects of surveillance operations. The former is critically important 
for the court to function as an effective gatekeeper. The latter is more central to 
effective rule making and will be discussed in Part III.B. 
While the need for increased transparency of the court’s operations has been front 
and center of FISA Court debate, the need to increase the flow of information to the 
court has been neglected. Even conceding that the FISA Court does not operate as a 
rubber stamp, lack of information about what the government is doing places a 
significant limitation on the FISA Court’s ability to engage in effective oversight. 
When the court is aware of government noncompliance, FISA judges have been able 
to devise mechanisms to monitor, deter, and remedy it. But often this happened only 
                                                                                                                 
 
 213. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 93, at 73; see supra note 93 and 
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after years of ongoing government violations. And while the FISA Court has put to 
use its power to demand additional information from the government, that power is 
only effective for so-called “known unknowns.” When it comes to compliance issues 
about which the court remains in the dark, the power to seek information is an empty 
letter. As is so often the case when it comes to oversight of classified government 
programs, the fundamental challenge here is that the FISA Court lacks the tools to 
independently verify how its orders are being carried out. We must therefore seek 
mechanisms designed to determine when (or how often) those orders are violated 
and to verify the government’s characterizations of its own activities.216  
a. Existing Information-Sharing Effectiveness 
As the now-public FISA Court documents show, the government time and again 
belatedly informed the court of instances of noncompliance—noncompliance that 
had sometimes persisted for years and for which the NSA could offer no satisfactory 
explanation.217 For a time, it seemed that close examination of any compliance 
problem simply revealed additional concerns.218 And it was not until 2008 that the 
government alerted the FISA Court to the fact that ECPA might limit the NSA’s 
power to disseminate information that had been collected under section 215 since 
2006.219  
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Promoting the flow of this type of information to the court would allow the court 
to be a more proactive gatekeeper, amplifying its effectiveness and reducing the 
duration of noncompliance incidents. Some of the court’s existing procedures aim to 
minimize the frequency of situations in which the court is left in the dark. Rule 13 of 
the FISA Court’s procedures, for example, requires the government to alert the court 
to misstatements and instances of noncompliance.220 And the NSA’s creation of an 
Office of Compliance is also a step in the right direction. But as it stands, the court 
remains entirely dependent on the government informing it about the programs that 
it approves. On at least one occasion, a FISA judge declared that “the Court no longer 
[had] confidence” that the information it received from the government indicating 
that the NSA was complying with the court’s orders was accurate.221  
Existing rules and institutions, in other words, have not been sufficient to ensure 
that the FISA Court has the information it needs. And while the USA FREEDOM 
Act increased transparency requirements for the court’s activities, it does little to 
increase the flow of information to the court.222 
b. Comparing the FISA Court to Other Information-Sharing Challenges 
The challenge of ensuring sufficient information flow from actors who benefit 
from not sharing information is not unique to the FISA Court context. Consider three 
information holders who might resist disclosing full and accurate information: 
prosecutors obligated to disclose to the defendant exculpatory information pursuant 
to Brady v. Maryland,223 law enforcement officials testifying regarding 
circumstances surrounding a search or seizure that has been challenged as 
unconstitutional, and intelligence officials required to keep congressional 
intelligence committees “fully and currently informed” about ongoing surveillance 
activities.224 In each of these areas, the entity in possession of relevant information 
can benefit from keeping that information secret—prosecutors are more likely to win 
convictions if defendants lack exculpatory information, law enforcement officials 
avoid exclusion of evidence they discovered if a judge is unaware that the evidence 
was gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and intelligence agencies retain 
more autonomy and flexibility when overseers lack knowledge of their activities. 
Government actors’ failure to fulfill their disclosure responsibilities in these contexts 
has proved resistant to reform. Consequently, skepticism regarding whether the 
situation can be improved in the FISA Court context is to be expected. There are 
good reasons to believe, however, that the kinds of reforms that have had only modest 
impact elsewhere are more likely to prove effective in assisting the FISA Court in 
acquiring necessary information.  
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A brief discussion of other information-flow challenges and ideas for their reform 
will highlight the ways in which the FISA Court is more amenable to reform. First, 
consider the context of prosecutors’ disclosure obligations under Brady. As 
commentators have pointed out for years, a prosecutor’s desire to gain convictions 
frequently results in a failure to provide the defense with all the relevant exculpatory 
information. Professor Miriam Baer has canvassed the many reform proposals 
seeking to minimize such violations and grouped them into three categories.225 The 
first category expands the scope of materials that the prosecutor must disclose.226 
This type of reform is premised on the idea that prosecutors alone cannot effectively 
provide to the defendant the information to which he is entitled. Another set of 
eyes—eyes looking through a lens not focused on attaining a conviction—is 
required.227  
The second type of Brady reform is to boost “the likelihood and degree of 
sanctions for noncompliance.”228 Under current law, prosecutors who violate Brady 
are immune from civil liability, and their supervisors are immune from claims 
founded on allegations of poor oversight or poor training.229 Prosecutors can 
themselves be prosecuted criminally, be held in contempt, or be subjected to 
professional sanctions by their state bar officials, but critics point to the infrequency 
with which these sanctions are employed.230 This situation has prompted some 
reformers to propose that courts make more use of a wider range of sanctions, 
including some that are less draconian, speculating that sanctions are more likely to 
be imposed if there are options short of criminal or contempt charges.231 
The third category of proposed Brady reforms involves efforts to improve “the 
internal processes and organizational dynamics of the offices in which prosecutors 
work.”232 Such improvements include additional training, efforts to modify social 
norms, internal compliance programs, and the like.233 Former Attorney General Eric 
Holder championed this type of approach when, among other reforms, he created a 
“national discovery coordinator,” “required each U.S. Attorney’s Office to designate 
a Brady coordinator[,] and required each office to verify that it had trained its 
attorneys in Brady and its progeny.”234 Lodging responsibility for institutional Brady 
compliance with specific individuals arguably places pressure on those individuals 
to ensure their colleagues follow the rules.  
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The phenomenon of law enforcement officials providing false testimony 
regarding their investigative actions is another area that presents information-flow 
challenges, and it is so common that it has its own name—“testilying.” Like Brady 
violations, the offense occurs regularly235 and is rarely sanctioned.236 
Many suggestions for reform have been made in this context as well. Professor 
Christopher Slobogin argues that the exclusionary rule creates such strong incentives 
to lie that the only way to reduce “testilying” is to abandon the exclusionary rule 
itself. If truthful testimony about arguably unconstitutional acts would not result in 
suppression of evidence, officers might feel less pressure to prevaricate. Instead, he 
suggests imposing severe punishments for perjury, rewards for providing testimony 
that is corroborated by other evidence, and a damages remedy for victims of 
unconstitutional law enforcement activity.237 Others have similarly suggested a focus 
on replacing evidence suppression with disciplinary action against offending 
officers. Penalties could be extreme—such as dismissal from the force—or more 
moderate—fines, loss of vacation time, official reprimands, etc.238 
In both of these contexts, serious concerns about the thoroughness of information 
sharing has arisen, and in both of them reform proposals have fallen into similar 
categories. First, they suggest modifying the operative rule to reduce perverse 
incentives—whether by making sure that the prosecutor is not the only one to see the 
information in her possession, or by eliminating the exclusionary rule. Second, they 
call for a wider spectrum of available sanctions for improper nondisclosure, 
recognizing reluctance to impose criminal or career-ending sanctions against law 
enforcement officials. Finally, they all envision a role for organizational reforms—such 
as increased training and modification of reporting or responsibility structures. 
While these reforms have had a limited effect on Brady violations and 
“testilying,” applying them to the FISA Court should prove much more effective. 
First, consider the differences in incentive structure. Taking NSA officials at their 
word, failure to report information to the FISA Court has been unintentional. Unlike 
misbehaving prosecutors or perjuring police officers, the NSA did not fail to disclose 
information it knew to be relevant to the lawfulness of its actions; it simply failed to 
recognize that it had such information. And, once it was discovered, the agency 
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promptly informed the court. This means that the problem to date has not been so 
much that the NSA has overwhelming incentives to withhold information that it has 
but instead that it failed to recognize that it even had such information.  
Moreover, even assuming that (at least some) NSA noncompliance has been 
intentional, any benefit that flows from withholding information is much more 
intangible in the FISA context. When police find incriminating evidence, or 
prosecutors find exculpatory evidence, the value of that information for the prosecution 
or the defense, respectively, is clear. The more critical the evidence, the greater the 
incentive to ensure that it is admissible (in the case of police discovery of incriminating 
evidence) or not provided to the defendant (in the case of a prosecutor with exculpatory 
evidence). Prosecutors and police officers who admit noncompliance are thus faced 
with the possibility that a specific alleged criminal—one whose crime they have 
invested time and energy in investigating and preparing to prosecute—will go free, 
adversely affecting both the public safety and possibly the individual officer’s or 
prosecutor’s own career prospects. If the NSA fails to comply with the rules, by 
contrast, the result might be destruction of the information and any work product 
based on that information—with uncertain and difficult to define consequences—or 
additional controls on information’s collection and use. There is no specific, tangible 
result; the world is no worse off than it was before the violation (though there may 
be career implications for the official). The uncertain value of the information means 
that the incentives to retain it or to continue collecting information like it are not as 
strong. This means that effective solutions in the FISA Court context need not 
involve drastic modifications to the existing incentives to counteract the 
overwhelming pressure to withhold information that actors in the criminal justice 
system face. 
Second, consider the impact of these differences on the imposition of sanctions. 
Sanctions against prosecutors and police officers are relatively extreme—prosecution, 
loss of law license, contempt sanctions—and judges have proved reluctant to impose 
them. Recognizing that most noncompliance is inadvertent, sanctions would 
constitute charges of carelessness, not maliciousness. They would therefore not carry 
the moral approbation that accompanies charges of prosecutorial misconduct or 
perjury. Judges’ and supervisors’ decisions to impose sanctions would therefore be 
less fraught, especially if the sanctions represented a wide range of possibilities as 
reformers in other areas have suggested.  
Third, because the information withheld from the FISA Court is hoarded 
inadvertently as opposed to intentionally, remedies aimed at assisting the NSA itself 
to uncover misconduct could be effective in a way that they have not been in the 
criminal context. Thus, internal institutional controls aimed at uncovering relevant 
information could prove particularly effective when it comes to FISA. If the 
challenge is to discover problems, as opposed to convincing the agency to reveal 
noncompliance, then modification of internal processes could yield benefits that have 
eluded prosecutors’ offices.  
Yet another information-sharing challenge is perhaps the most analogous to what 
the FISA Court faces: Congress’s efforts to remain sufficiently informed about secret 
government activities. The President is statutorily obligated to ensure that the 
congressional intelligence committees are kept “fully and currently informed” of 
U.S. intelligence activities, as well as “significant anticipated intelligence 
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activity.”239 This is usually accomplished through periodic briefings from the 
intelligence community officials to the chairs and ranking members of the House and 
Senate intelligence committees, who then (usually) make that information available 
to the rest of the committee. As with the FISA Court, this mechanism makes it 
difficult to uncover “unknown unknowns”—Congress can only ask questions about 
things of which it is aware—and throughout the intelligence committees’ history, 
there has been great debate with respect to whether this system is effective.240  
The FISA Court should be able to engage in more effective oversight than 
Congress. To be sure, Congress’s entitlement to information is statutorily mandated, 
and Congress possesses several tools with which it can pressure the executive branch 
for information should it want to do so.241 But even if Congress wanted to use its 
levers of power to engage in aggressive oversight, it is like the FISA Court in that it 
has no mechanism for determining when it is getting the full story, and when it should 
be digging for “unknown unknowns”—even aggressive oversight requires legislators 
to know what questions they should be asking.242 Moreover, as I have argued 
elsewhere, legislators’ incentives press against aggressive intelligence oversight.243 
And as Edward Snowden’s leaks have amply demonstrated—legislators knew about 
the section 215 metadata program since its inception—even the information that 
Congress does have may not be shared publicly, thereby significantly limiting its 
power to impact oversight.  
The FISA Court does not share these institutional deficiencies when it comes to 
oversight. As an initial matter, FISA judges need not seek reelection, so the political 
dynamics that limit legislators do not present an obstacle to FISA judges. Perhaps 
more importantly, however, FISA judges are much better positioned to discover the 
“unknown unknowns” that may exist. Whereas Congress gets a birds-eye view of the 
surveillance apparatus from intelligence officials’ briefings, FISA judges are 
involved with the day-to-day implementation of the various FISA-authorized 
surveillance programs. Judges thus have much more detailed information about the 
programs they are overseeing, receive more frequent updates with respect to the 
implementation of those programs, and generally are much more knowledgeable than 
Congress about the details and the mechanics of the surveillance programs they 
authorize. This means they are more likely to see red flags than legislators. They are 
also in a position to require the government to provide detailed, targeted reporting 
designed to explore red flags and ferret out compliance problems. 
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c. Information-Sharing Reforms 
This comparative institutional analysis helps determine both the likely value of 
existing FISA Court procedures as well as what sort of additional steps should be 
taken. As for existing measures, some have come from the NSA itself. In the wake 
of the major compliance problems revealed in 2009, the NSA made some changes. 
Recognizing that “its compliance and oversight infrastructure had not kept pace with 
its operational momentum and the evolving and challenging technological 
environment in which it functioned,” the NSA sought to “address these issues from 
a structural and managerial perspective, including thorough enhancements to its 
compliance structure.”244 The result was the creation of the position of the Director 
of Compliance, “whose sole function is to keep all of NSA’s mission activities 
consistent with the law and applicable policies and procedures” as well as “regular 
detailed senior leadership reviews of the compliance program.”245 The NSA has also 
enhanced its oversight coordination with the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).246  
These measures implement ideas similar to those floated in the criminal context to 
improve management and concentrate compliance responsibility in one institution, 
such as the creation of a national discovery coordinator. And to the extent that entities 
outside the NSA are involved—such as the ODNI or DOJ—they also mirror the 
category of Brady reforms that rely on having an independent set of eyes review 
relevant material. The suggested reform they have not adopted—at least explicitly—is 
the creation of a system of rewards and sanctions aimed at full information 
disclosure. 
Exploiting their intimate knowledge of the NSA’s operations, FISA judges 
themselves have implemented some additional measures. Many of these are also 
structural and management-related modifications designed to uncover the 
inadvertent nondisclosure that has been so problematic for the NSA, and they 
represent the kind of detailed micromanagement that congressional overseers cannot 
match. Examples include mandatory spot checks, required involvement from the 
Justice Department’s National Security Division—the mechanism through which at 
least one major compliance problem was identified247—and periodic reports to the 
FISA Court regarding the collection and dissemination of metadata and 
metadata-derived information. The USA FREEDOM Act supports FISA judges’ 
authority to impose such requirements in section 401 where it specifies that the Act’s 
authorization for the court to appoint an amicus curiae under certain circumstances 
is not meant to “limit the ability of [the court] to request or receive information” from 
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the government.248 The Court should continue to employ these mechanisms 
aggressively to identify early any compliance problems that arise.  
But more can, and should, be done. The PCLOB has endorsed at least one 
promising measure in the context of the section 702 program. In addition to any 
audits or reports that the NSA must submit to Congress, the PCLOB suggests that, 
“the government should submit with [its section 702 program applications] a random 
sample of [its collection results] and a random sample of the [query terms], with 
supporting documentation.”249 This in effect permits the court to perform its own 
spot check of the government’s activities, bringing an additional, unbiased set of eyes 
to the material. Similar requirements could be imposed on any collection program, 
and the FISA Court could use this information to verify that the government’s 
representations about its activities during the previous certification period were 
accurate.250 
In addition, existing compliance mechanisms must come attached with 
consequences and rewards. Just because a particular instance of noncompliance is 
inadvertent does not mean that nobody should be held responsible. As Judge Walton 
pointed out, many of the NSA’s systemic compliance problems stemmed from the 
fact that nobody had a sufficiently comprehensive understanding of the programs 
being implemented. One solution to this type of problem is to implement measures, 
like spot checks, that in effect force supervisors and high-ranking officials to pay 
more attention. But that solution is likely to be even more effective if supervisors are 
sanctioned for failing to discover noncompliance that they reasonably should have 
prevented or discovered earlier. To the extent previous issues arose from simply 
turning a blind eye to possible concerns, sanctions would improve compliance. 
FISA judges or NSA supervisors could be empowered to impose a broad menu of 
sanctions on officials who fail to take reasonable measures to prevent, deter, and 
detect overcollection. These sanctions could range from dismissal, to loss of vacation 
time, to an official reprimand, to loss of security clearance. This is not to say that 
NSA officials should not be subject to much more stringent penalties—up to and 
including criminal charges—for noncompliance that rises to that level. But it does 
recognize that most noncompliance does not fit that description, and aims to create a 
sanctions regime tailored to the level of culpability—incompetence, negligence, or 
lack of technical understanding—that is usually on display. Sanctions should be 
accompanied by positive reinforcement. Just as Professor Slobogin proposes rewards 
for police officers that present corroboration for their testimony,251 NSA officials 
who are particularly diligent in preventing or detecting overcollection should be 
rewarded. Rewards could be concrete—financial bonuses or extra vacation time, for 
example—or less tangible—an award or commendation.  
In sum, judges and legislators should pay more attention to ensuring the FISA 
Court has the information it needs to be an effective gatekeeper. And while some 
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measures already are in place, we know from other contexts where information 
sharing is a challenge that there are additional ways to improve the situation. 
B. Reforms of the FISA Court’s Rulemaking Role 
In Part II.B, I argued that the primary flaw in the court’s performance has been its 
failure to address, or to engage fully with, possible counterarguments to the 
government’s position when serving in its rulemaking role.252 This flaw stems from 
the fact that the court was designed as a gatekeeper, and several structural features 
of that regime are ill-suited to rule making. As a result, those features as they existed 
before the enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act have been the subject of 
widespread critique.253 First, the FISA Court’s essentially nonadversarial nature 
meant that FISA judges were not provided with counterarguments or critiques of the 
government’s position. Second, there was no institutionalized means of challenging 
a FISA judge’s initial analysis. While most Article III courts are constrained by the 
prospect of appellate review and the requirement that they provide a public, reasoned 
explanation for their decisions, FISA judges have operated on the (usually accurate) 
assumption that their opinions will be the final word on the issue and that they will 
remain secret. Which leads to the third concern—lack of transparency. Finally, the 
court must be able to understand the technical nuances of the programs whose 
lawfulness it interprets. As such, FISA judges must have access to sufficient 
technical expertise. The USA FREEDOM Act purportedly targets each of these 
flaws, but the result is a mere tinkering around the edges of the existing structure, 
rather than the significant modifications necessary to implement meaningful 
change.254 
1. Adversarial Proceedings 
Nearly all FISA Court reform proposals have recognized that if the court is to 
continue to operate as rule maker for programs permitting nonindividualized 
surveillance, its proceedings must incorporate adversarial elements.255 The 
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adversarial process is what the American judicial system relies upon to ensure that 
novel legal arguments are vetted thoroughly. It is premised on the idea that only by 
hearing from both parties, each with a concrete stake in the outcome, will the court 
be presented with the strongest arguments on each side.256 Indeed, when a case raises 
relevant arguments that are not supported by any of the parties to the litigation, 
federal courts will sometimes appoint amici to present those arguments in the most 
comprehensive, persuasive way.257 And while adversarial proceedings are not a 
panacea—courts reach controversial or inaccurate conclusions all the time—the odds 
of reaching the best results improve when courts have all arguments in front of them. 
It follows that when the court is engaged in rule making, its assessment of the 
government’s position is much more likely to avoid oversights or errors, and the 
quality of the FISA Court’s analysis and decision making will improve if there is a 
party tasked with presenting the best case against the government’s position. An 
adversarial system would also force the court to weigh these arguments and explain 
why it selected one side over the other.258 Improvement in this regard will produce 
not only higher quality opinions and analysis, but also provide additional credibility. 
If the government’s bulk-collection activities are approved by a FISA Court that 
thoroughly vetted the best arguments on each side, the validity of that determination 
will be more difficult to challenge. 
In the context of section 215, there is reason to believe that adversarial 
proceedings would have yielded a very different result. Prior to the Snowden leaks, 
section 215’s bulk-collection program was renewed over thirty times by over a dozen 
different FISA Court judges. None of these judges rejected the government’s position 
and none wrote an opinion examining the lawfulness of the program. After the leaks, 
two FISA Court decisions upheld the program, but a traditional federal district court 
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and a federal circuit court—with the benefit of the adversarial process—came out the 
other way.259 Moreover, the majority of the PCLOB, which had the benefit of 
extensive input from experts on all sides of the issue, concluded that the program 
was not authorized by statute.260 
Nearly every proposal to reform FISA Court operations agreed that an adverse 
party should participate in at least some FISA Court proceedings to inject adversarial 
process. “Whether called a ‘special,’ ‘public,’ ‘public interest,’ or ‘constitutional’ 
advocate, the core idea is the same—that a security-cleared lawyer should have the 
opportunity to challenge the government’s factual and legal case before the [FISA 
Court].”261 The proposals varied, however, with respect to where such an entity 
would be housed, from what pool of individuals or institutions it would be drawn, 
who would select it, and what powers it would have.262 Other variations include what 
cases that entity would participate in, what interests it would represent, to what 
information it would have access, and whether it could initiate an appeal or 
declassification of a FISA Court decision.  
The original—and most robust—form of the idea would have created an “Office 
of the Special Advocate” within the judicial branch.263 The Special Advocate would 
be chosen by the Chief Justice for a renewable three-year term, and could only be 
removed for cause. In addition to arguing in support of legal interpretations that 
protect individual privacy and civil liberties, the Special Advocate would have access 
to any documents or other materials necessary, could move the court to reconsider 
any decision, and could petition for a decision (or a summary of a decision, if it 
included classified information) to be disclosed publicly. Review of any decision 
appealed by the Special Advocate would be essentially mandatory, and the Special 
Advocate could appeal adverse decisions of the FISA Court of Review to the 
Supreme Court. Critically, the Special Advocate herself would determine when to 
seek to participate in FISA Court proceedings.264  
                                                                                                                 
 
 259. See Clapper, 785 F.3d at 821 (holding that the telephony metadata program was not 
consistent with the statutory language in section 215); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d. 
1, 41 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the 
section 215 program violated the Fourth Amendment), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 260. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 261. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case for a FISA “Special Advocate,” at 7 (Jan. 7, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Indiana Law Journal). 
 262. See, e.g., USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. § 401 (2014); FISA Court 
Reform Act of 2013, S. 1467, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013); Ensuring Adversarial Process in the 
FISA Court Act, H.R. 3159, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(5) (2013); FISA Improvements Act of 2013, 
S. 1631, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013); Remarks on United States Signals Intelligence, supra note 
35; GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 21, at 45–46; PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. REPORT, supra note 
43, at 203–05; Carr, supra note 62; Braun, supra note 42; Constitution Project Letter, supra 
note 256; see also Vladeck, supra note 262 (describing in detail the various proposals for a 
FISA advocate and their differences). 
 263. This description of the proposed Office of the Special Advocate relies upon Vladeck, 
supra note 262. 
 264. See Vladeck, supra note 262, at 7–8 (describing the initial vision for the role of the 
Special Advocate). 
1242 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 91:1191 
 
There was significant resistance within the intelligence community, however, to 
creating a truly independent Special Advocate, and the original proposal was 
diluted.265 Ultimately, the version of the Act that was enacted embraces the idea of 
encouraging FISA judges to appoint amici rather than creating a truly independent 
advocate. Under the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, the FISA Court  
shall appoint an . . . amicus curiae to assist such court in the consideration 
of any application . . . that, in the opinion of the court, presents a novel 
or significant interpretation of the law, unless the court issues a finding 
that such appointment is not appropriate.266 
Any amicus appointed pursuant to this section will provide the court with legal 
arguments that “advance the protection of individual privacy and civil liberties,” 
“information related to intelligence collection or communications technology,” or 
any other relevant arguments or information.267 The court is also permitted to appoint 
an amicus to provide technical expertise or to approve a motion by an individual or 
organization to file an amicus brief.268 As a result, the legislation includes some 
adversarial elements. 
Unfortunately, these new adversarial elements will produce only a negligible 
effect.  The first problem with the Act’s amicus provision is that it leaves the ultimate 
determination of when an adverse party participates to the court. In addition to the 
fact that the FISA Court—like any federal court—already possesses the power to 
appoint amici, part of the value of creating an adversarial process is in having a 
counterparty that may see arguments or issues that the FISA judges and the 
government do not recognize. The strength of the adversarial process comes not from 
the power of the courts to seek input when they so desire, but from a guarantee that 
each side will be presented in its most convincing form. It should therefore not be 
for the FISA Court to decide whether an opposing party might have something to 
add. Instead, it should be an advocate’s job to determine when a government 
application raises a privacy or civil liberty concern to which it wants to respond. The 
power to determine when to intervene should rest with the advocate, not the court.269  
Indeed, we have already seen indications that the amicus model falls short. In his 
opinion and order of June 17, 2015, Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV considered the 
question whether the USA FREEDOM Act, which was enacted after section 215 had 
been allowed to expire, reinstated the relevant expired provisions and amended them, 
or amended the version of the law to which section 215 reverted when it expired on 
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midnight on May 31, 2015. As Judge Saylor conceded, the question undoubtedly 
presents a “significant” legal issue and may present a “novel” one as well.270 Under 
the USA FREEDOM Act, FISA judges “shall appoint” an amicus to assist when 
considering “novel or significant” legal issues “unless the court issues a finding that 
such appointment is not appropriate.”271 Here, Judge Saylor found the appointment 
of an amicus not appropriate “because the legal question is relatively simple, or is 
capable of only a single reasonable or rational outcome.”272 Determining that “no 
reasonable jurist would reach a different decision” than he, no amicus needed to be 
appointed.273  
This application of amicus provision undermines its very purpose. The entire 
premise behind the need for adversarial proceedings is that there are arguments that 
may seem, based on government submissions, to be obviously correct, but that when 
scrutinized by someone charged with considering alternative interpretations become 
less plainly wrong. In other words, the point is to ensure that, when faced with a 
significant or novel legal issue, the FISA judge will have the benefit of arguments on 
both sides of the question. A unilateral conclusion that reasonable jurists necessarily 
would decide the issue only one way is the very one-sided decision making that the 
amicus provision was meant to prevent.  
This is not to say that Judge Saylor’s conclusion that the USA FREEDOM Act 
reinstated and amended the pre-sunset version of section 215 is implausible. It is not, 
however, the slam dunk that Saylor portrays it to be. Indeed, a purely textual reading 
of the USA FREEDOM Act demands the opposite conclusion. The version of section 
215 enacted in the PATRIOT Act very clearly ceased to be operable law at midnight 
on May 31, 2015.274 So when the USA FREEDOM Act was passed and signed into 
law on June 2, 2015, the law already had reverted to its pre-PATRIOT Act form. The 
USA FREEDOM Act says nothing about reinstating a different version of section 
215 or retroactively extending its sunset beyond June 1, 2015. Any conclusion that 
it did so requires a judge to look behind the language of the statute for extratextual 
evidence of a contrary congressional intent. Presumably these are the types of 
arguments that an amicus would have raised. 
Moreover, Saylor ignores additional benefits that an amicus’s involvement would 
yield. Even if Saylor’s legal conclusion is correct, there is value in having novel 
questions resolved with the benefit of an adversary, because that will lead to 
higher- quality opinions, more well-thought-out arguments, and, consequently, 
added public legitimacy. Indeed, Saylor recognizes that an amicus “might help to 
develop and refine arguments and to clarify the reasoning of the court.”275  
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Nevertheless, he eschews use of the mechanism here, and posits that in cases 
where amici would “result in some degree of additional expense and delay,” they 
should not be employed.276 Such considerations cannot be what Congress had in 
mind when permitting the FISA Court to decline to appoint an amicus when it was 
not “appropriate.”277 Employing an amicus in the FISA Court process will always 
result in some degree of additional expense and delay. It will use additional judicial 
resources. A briefing schedule that permits responses and replies will extend the time 
between a government filing and a final order. It will require additional hours from 
government lawyers and possibly even payment to compensate amici. So if it is not 
appropriate to use an amicus when it will result in any additional delay and expense, 
it is never appropriate to use an amicus. But Congress’s determination in passing the 
USA FREEDOM Act was that the tradeoff here—some additional time and expense 
in return for a more effective, accurate legal process—was worthwhile. That decision 
is not the FISA Court judges’ to make. It is a legislative judgment embedded in the 
law they must apply. The ineffectiveness of the amicus provision in the first time a 
FISA judge was faced with the obligation to appoint one demonstrates that when it 
comes to adding adversarial procedure, the USA FREEDOM Act falls short of what 
is required.  
2. Appeals 
Another critical reform to any process through which the FISA Court engages in 
rule making is providing the means to pursue appeals of progovernment decisions. 
Appeals, an inherent feature of an adversarial system, play a crucial role in any 
judicial rule making power. When novel questions of law are presented to a court, 
we do not necessarily expect them to be resolved perfectly the first time a court takes 
them under consideration. Rather, appeals courts review lower courts’ reasoning due 
to the fact that “[c]ourts of appeals . . . are structurally suited to the collaborative 
juridical process that promotes decisional accuracy.”278 In the words of Justice 
Frankfurter, “that fruitful interchange of minds which is indispensable to thoughtful, 
unhurried decision and its formulation in learned and impressive opinions” can come 
only with “discussion,” “reflection,” and “study.”279 In other words, the most 
effective analysis of questions of law is a collaborative one, necessarily involving 
multiple judges. And while a single FISA judge is of course capable of great 
reflection and study, discussion—and the collaborative process it reflects—can come 
only with a panel of judges. Moreover, the prospect of judicial review “should 
encourage a district court to explicate with care the basis for its legal conclusions.”280 
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Thus the very availability of appellate review should improve the quality of the initial 
judges’ opinions.  
Prior to the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act, only the government had the 
power to appeal most FISA Court decisions; thus, those decisions were rarely subject 
to this collaborative review process. Novel and complex legal questions have 
therefore been left in the hands of the one man or woman who happened to be on 
duty the week that they arose. This system compounded the FISA Court’s failure to 
fully analyze the government’s justification for the bulk-collection programs by 
providing that one FISA judge’s decision was in essence the final word on the 
subject.  
The government is fond of defending the telephony metadata bulk collection 
program with the argument that fifteen federal judges have approved it. But what is 
likely a more accurate description is that one judge approved it, and fourteen others 
(as well as Congress) declined to challenge their colleague’s conclusion. Moreover, 
as FISA Court orders addressing novel questions serve as persuasive authority in 
subsequent cases, one could argue that no judge considered the definition of 
“relevance” in the bulk telephony context. Rather, the first FISA judge faced with a 
section 215 application for bulk collection of telephony data simply relied upon 
Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s interpretation of “relevance” in the pen/trap context, and all 
subsequent judges faced with the question (as well as Congress) accepted that 
interpretation.281  
Moreover, existing debates ignore the fact that the errors emerging from the FISA 
Court appeals system will not occur at random. Assuming that appeals courts will 
not reach the proper result 100 percent of the time, FISA’s asymmetrical appeals 
structure, which permits only the government to appeal adverse decisions, has 
predictable effects on both the outcome of cases and the development of the 
substantive law. As an initial matter, permitting only the government to appeal means 
that any erroneous judgments are more likely to be “wrong” in the government’s 
favor—in other words, the FISA Court and FISA Court of Review are more likely to 
approve surveillance requests that should have been denied than to deny requests that 
should have been granted.282 This is an intuitive result. For any application that 
should be denied, the government has two opportunities to convince a court that it 
should be approved. First, there is the FISA judge. As no decision maker is perfect, 
the FISA Court will at times grant orders it should deny—in other words, the FISA 
judge will sometimes issue false positives—and there is no means to subject that 
(incorrect) decision to appellate review. If the FISA judge does deny a government 
application, however, the government may appeal to the FISA Court of Review, 
which is also fallible and therefore will sometimes erroneously overturn a FISA 
judge’s (appropriate) denial of a surveillance order. In other words, the asymmetrical 
appeals system is more likely to produce false positives (granting surveillance orders 
that should not have been granted) than to suffer from false negatives (denying a 
surveillance order that should have been granted). 
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Limiting appeals to the government might also have the effect of pushing the 
development of the law in the government’s favor.283 A FISA judge can avoid 
generating appeals and the concomitant possibility of reversal by granting the 
government’s order. This means that even eliminating all other possible causes of 
progovernment bias, the judges have incentives to grant all plausible surveillance 
orders. Thus the applications that are denied and appealed will represent the most 
aggressive government surveillance efforts. Sometimes the appeals court will also 
deny that application. But sometimes it may grant it, thereby expanding the scope of 
permissible surveillance operations. As this process repeats itself over time, 
surveillance authorities will therefore slowly grow broader. Of course, so far as we 
know, the FISA Court of Review is rarely asked to review denied applications 
(probably because there are almost none), so the process in this context would be 
very slow indeed. It is, nevertheless, a likely result of limiting appeals to the 
government. 
Again, the USA FREEDOM Act adopted a toothless solution to this problem. It 
provides that the FISA Court “shall certify for review to the [FISA Court of Review] 
any question of law . . . that the court determines warrants such review because of a 
need for uniformity or because . . . [it] would serve the interests of justice.”284 This 
provides a mechanism for judicial review of FISA judge rule-making decisions that 
the government does not control. The Act should, however, have granted the amicus 
the right to request reconsideration of FISA Court decisions as well, to appeal FISA 
Court or FISA Court of Review decisions, and to participate in those appeals.285 An 
adversarial process with no power to appeal is not a true adversarial process. If the 
amicus’s role is to represent the interests of the American people, we must establish 
a system that allows her to do so at her own discretion and at all states of litigation, 
rather than leaving it to the court.  
3. Transparency 
FISA Court critics proposed several ways to increase the transparency of the 
court’s operations and opinions. Transparency of judicial decisions is critical for 
oversight of the government generally, including oversight of the courts. Had the 
court’s opinions interpreting the meaning of “relevant” in the pen/trap statute and 
section 215 been public when they were initially issued, the USA FREEDOM Act 
itself might have passed years ago. Indeed, one only needs to look at the impetus for 
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the recent public and legislative debate over surveillance—massive leaks of secret 
information, including secret FISA Court orders and opinions—to recognize the way 
in which transparency promotes accountability and more thoroughly vetted policy. 
Making judicial decisions available to the public exposes flawed or unpersuasive 
rulings as well as potentially undesirable developments in the law. Some of the 
proposals for increased transparency were aimed at informing the public at large. 
Others were designed to ensure that Congress—or some portion of Congress, such 
as its intelligence committees—is sufficiently informed to facilitate its own oversight 
activities.  
The USA FREEDOM Act attempted to address transparency in both the public 
and congressional contexts. Section 602 of the Act provides that the Director of 
National Intelligence and the Attorney General “shall conduct a declassification 
review of each decision, order, or opinion issued by the [FISA Court or the FISA 
Court of Review] that includes a significant construction or interpretation of any 
provision of law . . . [and] make publicly available to the greatest extent practicable 
each such decision, order, or opinion.”286 This provision will make more FISA Court 
opinions that engage in rule making available to the public. And while FISA already 
required that the Attorney General report all opinions that include significant 
construction or interpretation of FISA to the congressional intelligence oversight 
committees,287 another section of the USA FREEDOM Act ensures that those 
opinions also promptly make their way to Congress.288 
These provisions, while promising, suffer from flaws similar to the amicus and 
the appeals provisions. As with oversight of any classified or otherwise secret 
operations, there is a fundamental tension between transparency and intelligence 
collection.289 Because they are responsible for maximizing intelligence collection 
effectiveness, members of the intelligence community itself cannot serve as 
independent arbiters of what should be made public. They will tend to value 
intelligence over transparency, and they will tend to have extremely low tolerance 
for any risk that transparency might pose. The USA FREEDOM Act, however, 
assigns to executive branch officials the decision whether an opinion qualifies for 
being made publicly available—that is, whether it is a “significant construction or 
interpretation of any provision of law.”290 Moreover, the Act requires that the 
Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General make FISA Court 
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opinions publicly available only “to the greatest extent practicable.”291 In addition, 
the Director of National Intelligence may waive the declassification requirement 
altogether if “necessary to protect the national security of the United States or 
properly classified intelligence sources or methods.”292 These exceptions are likely 
to swallow the rule.  
Another flaw in the USA FREEDOM Act transparency provision is that it is 
limited to FISA Court decisions, orders, and opinions. There may be instances in 
which true transparency calls for additional documents to be released—submissions 
to the court, for example, or transcripts of proceedings.  
4. Promoting the FISA Court’s Use of Technical Expertise  
Another meaningful step toward ensuring a more effective rule making 
performance by the FISA Court—and one that the USA FREEDOM Act partially 
embraced—is to ensure that FISA judges have access to increased technical 
expertise. The NSA’s surveillance programs make use of the latest, cutting-edge 
technology. This technology is complex and constantly evolving. Indeed, some of 
the compliance issues that the NSA experienced have stemmed from the fact that 
“from a technical standpoint, there was no single person [at the NSA] who had a 
complete technical understanding of the . . . system architecture.”293 Moreover, 
compliance measures are more and more frequently built into the surveillance 
programs themselves as filters, or limits on searches, or firewalls on access to 
particular databases. Software fixes, for example, sought to prevent queries using 
non-RAS-approved identifiers after the NSA discovered that non-RAS-approved 
queries were accessing the metadata databases.294 Judges need to be aware of the 
oversight opportunity that such software-based mechanisms present, as well as their 
limitations. Thus to fully understand both the programs it is overseeing and whether 
existing compliance or minimization procedures are going to be effective in carrying 
out the court’s orders, the court must be able to understand and assess complex 
surveillance technology and software.295 
The USA FREEDOM Act—consistent with recommendations from both the 
President’s Review Group296 and the PCLOB297—took one step to improve the 
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court’s available expertise. Section 402 of that Act facilitates increased access to 
technical expertise by providing that the court “may appoint an individual or 
organization to . . . provide technical expertise, in any instance as such court deems 
appropriate.”298 As with the amicus provision, however, this gives the Court no 
authority that it did not already have under its inherent powers. Perhaps Congress’s 
suggestion to make use of this power will make FISA judges more likely to do so, 
but it is unclear that this provision will result in actual change.  
I would suggest an additional measure toward promoting expertise: removing the 
term limit for FISA judges. To the extent there is a shortfall of technical knowledge 
on the court, it is compounded by the way the court operates. First, recall that each 
judge may serve only one seven-year term. So after accumulating seven years’ worth 
of expertise on both the complicated legal regime governing FISA and the 
technology implementing that regime, one FISA judge is replaced by another who 
lacks this expertise. Similar concerns about personnel turnover sapping expertise 
prompted the abolition of term limits on the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence.299 Just as members of Congress develop expertise in the issues over 
which the committees on which they sit exercise jurisdiction, FISA judges develop 
expertise in their time on the court. This expertise should be retained rather than 
dismissed. 
A final thought on boosting the FISA Court’s rule-making chops. It is not clear 
that encouraging the court to parse more carefully the government’s bulk-collection 
arguments will result in a net increase in privacy protections. To be sure, it might 
result in a more narrowly conscribed interpretation of FISA, but that is not the same 
thing. When one route of intelligence collection is limited, the government has often 
implemented alternatives that might yield even larger losses in privacy. When the 
Bush Administration felt too constrained by FISA in the wake of 9/11, for example, 
it implemented the Terrorist Surveillance Program, a new, secret program with 
broader surveillance authority than even the most forgiving interpretation of FISA 
provided.300 Similarly, on a more granular level, when the FBI has been refused 
individual section 215 orders, it has at times acquired the same information through 
the use of National Security Letters (a form of administrative subpoena), which do 
not have the benefit of any judicial oversight.301 So we must acknowledge the 
possibility that denial of statutorily approved surveillance might result in a similar 
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form of surveillance, though less transparent and less-fully supervised, under 
executive authority.  
CONCLUSION  
As the FISA Court approaches its fourth decade, it is being asked to do more than 
ever before, and certainly more than Congress envisioned for it in 1978. Looking at 
the different roles the court now plays makes plain that the magnitude of the post
9/11 changes assigning to the court rule-making responsibilities has been 
underappreciated. The USA FREEDOM Act sought to address some of the court’s 
rule-making deficiencies. Its minor modifications to the court’s proceedings, 
however, fail to account for the unique challenges of rule-making and are therefore 
doomed to fail. Moreover, Congress passed up a prime opportunity to render even 
more effective the court’s already laudable gatekeeping activities by focusing on the 
flow of information from the executive to the FISA Court. 
 
